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I. INTRODUCTION 
In June 2010, the Supreme Court issued its decision in Holder v. 
Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”), upholding the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (“§ 2339B”), the criminal 
ban on providing material support to designated foreign terrorist 
organizations (“FTOs”).1  
The opinion, which represents the culmination of a lengthy legal 
dispute, generated immediate commentary for its contribution to 
First Amendment jurisprudence2 because it sustained the 
criminalization of providing material support in the form of speech, 
whether through “training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” 
and “personnel” to an FTO, even when the support was intended for 
peaceful purposes, such as petitioning the United Nations for relief 
or engaging in political advocacy on the FTO’s behalf.3 The focus on 
the First Amendment implications of the decision is understandable, 
given the high stakes involved; a conviction under the statute can, in 
regular circumstances, garner up to fifteen years in prison, with a life 
sentence possible for material support that can be tied to any actual 
loss of life.4 
In addition to the constitutional significance of the opinion, 
HLP marks the first time the Supreme Court has delved into a 
lengthy discussion of what it believes counts as terrorism.5 Prior 
Supreme Court opinions, whether before or after September 11, 
 
 1. Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010). 
 2. See, e.g., Leading Cases—Freedom of Speech and Expression—Material Support for 
Terrorism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 179, 259 (2010); Editorial, A Bruise on the First Amendment, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 2010, at A26; Editorial, The Supreme Court Goes Too Far in the Name of 
Fighting Terrorism, WASH. POST, June 22, 2010, at A18; Joanne Mariner, Talking to 
Terrorists: The Worst U.S. Supreme Court Decision of the Term, FINDLAW (July 7, 2010), 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/mariner/20100707.html; What Counts as Abetting Terrorists, 
ROOM FOR DEBATE BLOG (June 21, 2010, 3:21 PM), 
http://roomfordebate.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/what-counts-as-abetting-terrorists/ 
?scp=2&sq=humanitarian%20law%20project&st=cse (online discussion on the implications of 
the Supreme Court’s opinion featuring David Cole, Andrew R. McCarthy, Richard C. Epstein, 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Robert Chesney, and Diane Marie Amann). 
 3. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2708 (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2006)). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly provides material support 
or resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”). 
 5. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2712–27. 
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2001, tended to consider terrorism as a tactic that nations or groups 
hostile to the United States engaged in, without further defining 
what activities qualified under the term. Stated differently, the 
Supreme Court had never before discussed its perceptions of what 
constitutes terrorism, preferring instead to place limits on “terrorist 
activity,” without elaborating much further.6 HLP allowed the Court 
to reveal how it perceived and envisioned “terrorism” and a 
“terrorist group.”7 It also moved the discussion beyond 
characterizing terrorism as a mere tactic to viewing acts of politically 
motivated violence as defining every aspect of an FTO, thereby de-
legitimating any action or activity in which the FTO might engage.8 
In other words, the fact that a group uses impermissible violence 
serves to define its every action and goal as illegitimate, regardless of 
how far removed from violence some of those actions are and 
notwithstanding the perceived justness of the group’s cause. 
For the Supreme Court to provide a detailed discussion of the 
contours of what makes up material support for a terrorist group is 
perhaps unsurprising, but that it only did so for the first time in June 
2010 underscores the novelty of the decision. By defining material 
support to such a degree, however, the Court entered into a debate 
concerning whether allowing the government wide latitude to define 
the groups that threaten the United States directly and/or indirectly 
creates what appears to be an unresolvable tension with the First 
Amendment.9 The majority opinion in HLP represents one view on 
the nature of a designated FTO, which demonstrates how the tactic 
of terrorism has overwhelmed the discussion of the legitimacy of any 
non-state political actor, no matter the context in which any violence 
perpetrated by that actor occurs. Furthermore, the Court affirmed 
the constitutionality of the ban on providing material support in the 
form of speech on a theory that such support contributes to a 
group’s “legitimacy,” with no connection to violence or an FTO’s 
illegal goals being necessary.10 Leaving aside the designation of 
groups said to harm the United States, the majority opinion indicates 
that the government’s prerogatives in designating a group that has 
 
 6. See infra Parts II–III. 
 7. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2725–30. 
 8. See id. at 2729–30. 
 9. See id. at 2730–31. 
 10. Id. at 2710–11; see also infra Part IV.E.2–3. 
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not and does not seek to directly harm the United States outweigh 
the First Amendment rights of the individual citizen hoping to aid a 
foreign entity.11 
Finally, the opinion embraces both the theories and evidence 
that the government presented as to how terrorist groups operate 
without challenging the validity of these theories in any way.12 In 
light of the proof offered in the HLP litigation and when juxtaposed 
with the facially plausible claim that assisting an FTO in advocating 
for its cause by peaceful means can deter violence, requiring the 
government to present additional, direct evidence to support its 
contentions about the nature of terrorist groups should not be 
considered too far-fetched or onerous. While it is perhaps unrealistic 
to think that Congress will reconsider revising any aspect of § 2339B 
in the current political climate, the government should be required 
to make a greater showing linking material support to violence, lest 
§ 2339B remain constitutionally infirm and politically rigid, capable 
only of condemning a group in its entirety, with no prospect of ever 
returning from FTO status.13 Further, a ban on material support to 
an FTO in the form of speech should necessitate stronger proof that 
the FTO is an actual threat to national security, not merely a 
“foreign policy interest.” The two issues are not the same. 
This Article places HLP and the Supreme Court’s encounters 
with the concept of “terrorism” in historical context, and then 
discusses the HLP decision in light of that history. In so doing, the 
Article demonstrates how the Supreme Court’s construction of 
terrorism has evolved from that of a mere tactic used by subnational 
groups to an existential threat that must be combated, regardless of 
group or cause, at least rhetorically. HLP marks the first time the 
Supreme Court has given judicial imprimatur to the idea that 
“money is fungible,” i.e., that any and all funds that go to a terrorist 
organization, regardless of its purpose—violent, political, or 
charitable—constitute material support to a banned FTO.14 
However, the Court did not stop there, ruling that material support 
that takes the form of speech could be banned because it provides 
 
 11. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2710–11. 
 12. See id. at 2724–26. 
 13. For an in-depth discussion of this point, see Wadie E. Said, The Material Support 
Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 543, 566–76 (2011). 
 14. Id. at 579 (quoting Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2725) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:07 PM 
1455 Humanitarian Law Project 
 1459 
legitimacy to an FTO, which can only serve to strengthen its resolve 
to fight.15 This Article explains that while the government has an 
interest in stopping American citizens and residents from providing 
support that leads to violence, a criminal ban on support that 
bestows only legitimacy, with no link to violent activity, cannot stand 
when an FTO’s quarrel is not with the United States. Such a stance 
constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on speech in violation of 
the First Amendment. 
Part II of this Article analyzes the Supreme Court’s encounters 
with what could be termed “terrorism” in the pre-9/11 era, when it 
was considered merely a tactic that had not yet risen to the level of 
an existential threat. Part III discusses the Supreme Court’s 
terrorism-related jurisprudence in the wake of 9/11, in which the 
specter of al-Qaeda-type terrorism informed and influenced the 
Court’s effort to balance national security concerns with civil 
liberties. Part IV of this Article introduces § 2339B and the 
circumstances under which it was passed, explaining that § 2339B 
reflects the transformative role that terrorism began to play on the 
national stage. Part IV also discusses the stages of the HLP litigation 
up through the Supreme Court’s opinion, criticizing the Court’s 
deferential position vis-à-vis the government. The Article concludes 
by arguing that the Court’s analysis of § 2339B does not comport 
with the First Amendment, given its overly broad construction of 
terrorism that reaches beyond violence to political disputes with 
which the United States has no connection. 
II. PRE-9/11 TERRORISM JURISPRUDENCE 
A review of the Supreme Court’s consideration of what 
constitutes “terrorism” throughout history reveals, in a rather 
straightforward manner, general disapproval of “terrorist” tactics. 
However, in the period between the turn of the twentieth century 
and the advent of the era of the airplane hijacking, terrorism, despite 
being legally impermissible, was considered to be a mere tactic, and 
not a type of existential threat to American civilization. As a tactic, 
therefore, it was essentially understood to be the use of violence by 
non-state actors to compel a change in the policy of the ruling 
authorities. Later, in the several decades before 9/11, the Court 
 
 15. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2710–11. 
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made various statements regarding the generalized threat of 
terrorism, but still considered the threat remote and foreign. 
A. The First Appearance of “Terrorism” 
The first appearance of the term “terrorism” in a Supreme Court 
opinion occurred in a dispute arising over the suspension of habeas 
corpus in certain Philippine provinces during the period of the 
United States’ occupation of the country in the wake of the Spanish-
American War.16 The governing authorities had argued that 
suspension was warranted owing to the “state of insecurity and 
terrorism among the people which makes it impossible in the 
ordinary way to conduct preliminary investigations before justices of 
the peace and other judicial officers.”17 The conditions that gave rise 
to this determination had their root in a local rebellion against 
American rule, and the occupying authorities felt the need to 
stigmatize their adversaries for challenging that rule by violence.18 In 
couching the call for a suspension of habeas corpus as a method to 
combat terrorism, the U.S. authorities’ use of the phrase “terrorism” 
was intended to convey a sense of particularly acute violence that 
demanded strong and rapid state action. The purpose of such a 
characterization probably formed part of an effort to delegitimize the 
group in question—in this case, a group of Filipino rebels resisting 
the United States’ presence in the country. This approach obviously 
resonates with the modern strategy of employing the terrorist label 
to delegitimize one’s opponent. It is also of note that the label of 
“terrorism” was applied to an indigenous, non-state actor fighting 
 
 16. See generally Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906). 
 17. Id. at 179–80 (emphasis added). 
 18. See id. at 179. 
  Whereas certain organized bands of ladrones exist in the provinces of Cavite 
and Batangas, who are levying forced contributions upon the people, who 
frequently require them, under compulsion, to join their bands, and who kill or 
maim in the most barbarous manner those who fail to respond to their unlawful 
demands, and are therefore terrifying the law-abiding and inoffensive people of 
those provinces; and 
  Whereas these bands have, in several instances, attacked police and 
constabulary detachments, and are in open insurrection against the constituted 
authorities; and 
  Whereas it is believed that these bands have numerous agents and confederates 
living within the municipalities of the said provinces . . . . 
Id. 
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against what it must have perceived as a malevolent foreign 
occupation, while United States officials in the Philippines assuredly 
viewed the ladrones as criminals resisting lawful authority.19 
Ultimately, the petition was dismissed on technical and mootness 
grounds, given that the suspension of habeas corpus was revoked the 
day the petition was filed.20 
B. Criminal Syndicalism 
The term “terrorism” next reappeared in a Supreme Court 
opinion in a decidedly domestic context—that of a radical labor 
union organizing in the period following World War I. On the same 
day in 1927, the Supreme Court decided Whitney v. California21 and 
Burns v. United States,22 both of which upheld the constitutionality 
of California’s criminal syndicalism statute. Along with twenty-two 
other states, California had passed a criminal syndicalism law in an 
effort to criminalize the activities of the Industrial Workers of the 
World (the “IWW” or “Wobblies”), who had opposed the United 
States’ involvement in World War I by, inter alia, encouraging 
workers to decrease industrial production in service of the war 
effort.23 Under the statute, anyone who “[o]rganize[d] or assist[ed] 
in organizing, or [was] or knowingly bec[a]me a member of, any 
organization, society, group or assemblage of persons organized or 
assembled to advocate, teach or aid and abet criminal syndicalism . . . 
[was] guilty of a felony and punishable by imprisonment.”24 Criminal 
syndicalism was defined as 
 
 19. See id. 
 20. See id. at 181–82; see also Trevor W. Morrison, Suspension and the Extrajudicial 
Constitution, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1533, 1570 n.181 (2007). 
 21. 274 U.S. 357 (1927). Whitney is a seminal decision in the area of free-speech, with 
Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion occupying a vaunted place in the First Amendment 
pantheon; Professor Vincent Blasi has called it “arguably the most important essay ever 
written, on or off the bench, on the meaning of the [F]irst [A]mendment.” Vincent Blasi, The 
First Amendment and the Ideal of Civic Courage: The Brandeis Opinion in Whitney v. 
California, 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 653, 668 (1988). See also Ashutosh A. Bhagwat, The Story 
of Whitney v. California, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 407-08 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 
2004). 
 22. 274 U.S. 328 (1927). 
 23. See Blasi, supra note 21, at 653–56. 
 24. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360 (quoting section 2 of California’s Criminal Syndicalism 
Act) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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any doctrine or precept advocating, teaching or aiding and abetting 
the commission of crime, sabotage (which word is hereby defined 
as meaning wilful [sic] and malicious physical damage or injury to 
physical property), or unlawful acts of force and violence or 
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a 
change in industrial ownership or control or effecting any political 
change.25 
Therefore, “terrorism” was not defined in the statute. Rather, it 
was merely one of the enumerated tactics that was outlawed when 
directed at “accomplishing a change in industrial ownership or 
control or effecting any political change.”26 This appears to be the 
first time the Supreme Court considered a statute with such a stated 
purpose. However, despite the novelty of the statute’s phraseology, 
one can glean some idea of what is meant by “terrorism” when 
considering the other methods listed in the criminal syndicalism law: 
crime; sabotage, which the statute defines as “willful and malicious 
physical damage or injury to physical property”; and “unlawful acts 
of force and violence.”27 The serious nature of these other methods 
listed in the criminal syndicalism law illustrates that the statute likely 
contemplated that a charge of “terrorism” would only be 
supportable by fairly egregious actions.  
This relevant statutory context underscores why it is somewhat 
surprising that the Supreme Court in Whitney upheld a conviction 
for terrorism in a case where the actions of the convicted were far 
afield from the activities for which the statutory language seemingly 
contemplated the imposition of criminal liability. Anita Whitney was 
charged with violating California’s statute based on her participation 
in the founding convention of the Communist Labor Party of 
California, a grouping of individuals who broke off from the Socialist 
Party based on their desire to join the Communist International.28 
The Supreme Court characterized the Party’s aim as one of political 
action geared to overthrow capitalism based on the belief that “the 
capture of political power . . . by the revolutionary working class 
[would] be of tremendous assistance to the workers in their struggle 
 
 25. Id. at 359–60 (emphasis added) (quoting section 1 of California’s Criminal 
Syndicalism Act) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. at 360. 
 28. See id. at 364–65; see also Blasi, supra note 21, at 657–58. 
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of emancipation.”29 Ironically, while the California branch of the 
Communist Labor Party adopted a platform of direct action and 
strikes, at the convention Whitney herself had advocated for a less 
radical program of change via electoral politics.30  
Ultimately, the Court acknowledged the state of California’s 
legitimate police power to pass the Criminal Syndicalism Act, 
reasoning that it had been structured to combat actions “inimical to 
the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, 
or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten 
its overthrow by unlawful means.”31 Terrorism was but one tactic, 
nebulously undefined though it was, that organizations like the IWW 
or the Communist Labor Party adopted in the service of their aims: 
namely, changing significant aspects of how the United States was 
governed. The structural threat posed by what Anita Whitney stood 
for, not the tactics she employed—which were decidedly non-
violent, after all—was the object of the Act, and the political climate 
of the day ensured her conviction on that basis. After all, Whitney is 
best remembered for Justice Brandeis’s concurring opinion applying 
the clear and present danger test to invalidate Whitney’s conviction 
on the basis that no “immediate serious violence was to be expected 
or was advocated,” nor did “the past conduct furnish[] reason to 
believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.”32 During the 
first part of the twentieth century, radical labor unions were 
considered so illegitimate by state and federal government that even 
nonviolent speech could be equated to violence in service of such 
groups. It would not be until 1969 that the Supreme Court 
overturned Whitney, finding the similarly worded Ohio Criminal 
Syndicalism Act unconstitutional insofar as it criminalized advocacy 
and assembly to promote political reform.33 
Like the petitioner in Whitney, the petitioner in Burns v. United 
States had also been convicted under California’s Criminal 
 
 29. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 364–65. 
 30. See Blasi, supra note 21, at 657–58. 
 31. Whitney, 274 U.S. at 371. 
 32. Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see also Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Nobody’s Fools: 
The Rational Audience as First Amendment Ideal, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 799, 814 (“At its 
core, Justice Brandeis’ opinion envisions a body of informed citizens engaging in a rational 
exercise in self-governance.”). 
 33. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 448–49 (1969) (distinguishing between 
mere advocacy and unlawful “incitement to imminent lawless action”). 
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Syndicalism Act.34 The Burns petitioner’s actions leading to his 
conviction were taken in Yosemite National Park, which, by act of 
Congress, was subject to the laws of California; the petitioner’s 
actions were not otherwise prohibited by federal law.35 Specifically, 
he was charged with “assist[ing] in organizing, and . . . knowingly 
bec[oming] a member of an organization, society, group and 
assemblage of persons organized and assembled to advocate, teach, 
aid and abet criminal syndicalism,” namely, the IWW.36 The main 
focus of the opinion concerned the construction of the term 
“sabotage” under the statute.37 Under the Court’s analysis, 
“sabotage” is directly linked to “terrorism,” both of which can be 
carried out by destruction of property, not simply by harming 
individuals.38 Critically, the opinion links attempt to bring about 
some sort of industrial or political reform with sabotage and 
terrorism. Despite these linkages, however, terrorism remained a 
nebulous and unclear term—perhaps deliberately so—that was used 
in service of a movement within government to stamp out the threat 
posed by radical labor unions, chief among them the IWW. The real 
threat was not the tactic of terrorism, but the perceived unnerving 
nature, to the ruling classes, of the IWW’s goal of redefining socio-
economic relations within the United States.39 The fact that most 
 
 34. See 274 U.S. 328, 330 (1927). 
 35. Id. at 330–31. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See id. at 333 (giving as examples of sabotage “injuring machinery[,] . . . putting 
emery dust in lubricating oil, damaging materials[,] . . . scattering foul seed in fields, driving 
tacks and nails in grape vines and fruit trees to kill them, using acid to destroy guy wires 
holding up the poles provided to support growing vines, putting pieces of wire and the like 
among vines to destroy machines used to gather crops, scattering matches and using chemicals 
to start fires to destroy property of employers”). 
 38. See id. at 335 (“The advocating of the malicious commission of such acts is to teach 
and abet sabotage—physical damage and injury to physical property; it also is to teach and abet 
crime and unlawful methods of terrorism.”). 
 39. See Ahmed A. White, The Crime of Economic Radicalism: Criminal Syndicalism 
Laws and the Industrial Workers of the World, 1917–1927, 85 OR. L. REV. 649, 652 (2006) 
(“In the late 1910s and early 1920s, almost half of American states and territories enacted 
criminal syndicalism laws that essentially criminalized any sort of challenge to industrial 
capitalism. These laws did this under the guise of criminalizing advocacy of ‘political or 
industrial change’ by means of ‘sabotage,’ ‘terrorism,’ and other criminal conduct. In practice, 
it mattered little that the targets of these laws seldom, if ever, actually advocated such conduct 
as means of social change, or that key terms in the statutes, like sabotage, were only vaguely 
and ambiguously defined. What mattered instead was the ability to use these laws to outlaw the 
advocacy of social change itself, a purpose for which the statutes’ ambiguities were well-suited 
and its targets’ legal innocence was irrelevant.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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individuals charged under criminal syndicalism statutes rarely 
constituted a threat did not prevent the vigorous enforcement of 
these statutes. Whitney and Burns thus demonstrate the Court’s 
willingness to countenance outlawing advocacy when the existential, 
as opposed to tangible, threat is perceived to be real.40 
C. From World War II Through the Cold War 
The theme of a threat to American national security persisted in 
the Supreme Court’s continued exposure to, and analysis of, the 
term “terrorism.” In 1946, the Court decided Duncan v. 
Kahanamoku, a case involving a challenge to the constitutionality of 
military tribunals established by the state of Hawaii to try civilians in 
the wake of the attack on Pearl Harbor of December 7, 1941.41 
Although the Court recognized that the Hawaiian Organic Act 
allowed the governor of Hawaii to declare martial law, the Court did 
not go so far as to permit the governor to replace the state’s normal 
court system with military tribunals.42 
The term “terrorism” appears only once in Duncan, and, for that 
matter, only in Justice Burton’s dissent, not in the majority 
opinion.43 Justice Burton objected to the Court’s failure to defer to 
the executive branch on matters such as emergency decisions in 
wartime, e.g., administering Hawaii in the wake of Pearl Harbor, a 
situation he described as grim.44 Based on a review of the Court’s 
previous opinions, this appears to be the first time that a member of 
the Court uses the term “terrorism” specifically in the context of 
international war. However, here the act of war that violated 
 
 40. See, e.g., Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
655, 664, 729 (2009) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1971)) (noting 
that “Whitney had been ‘thoroughly discredited’” by the Supreme Court in Brandenburg, and 
highlighting the view that Whitney was one of a series of “bad decisions motivated by fear and 
paranoia”). 
 41. See 327 U.S. 304, 307 (1946). 
 42. See id. at 315–17; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 2004 SUP. CT. 
REV. 47, 85. 
 43. See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 341 (Burton, J., dissenting). 
 44. See id. at 340–42 (“Military attack by air, sea and land was to be expected. The 
complete disregard of international law evidenced by the first attack and the possible presence on 
the Islands of many Japanese collaborators gave warning that the enemy’s next move might take 
the form of disastrous sabotage and terrorism among civilians. The extraordinary breach of 
international law evidenced by the attack made it essential to take extraordinary steps to 
protect the Islands against subversive action that might spring from deeply laid plans as secret, 
well aimed, and destructive as the original attack.” (emphasis added)). 
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international law was the attack on Pearl Harbor, which could have 
led, depending on what the Japanese had been able to accomplish by 
way of subsequently occupying Hawaii, to terrorism and sabotage 
engulfing the Hawaiian Islands themselves.45 Even so, terrorism, 
while certainly an evocative term, played a decidedly minor and 
derivative role in the opinion, particularly when compared with the 
attack on Pearl Harbor. In this instance, terrorism was a tactic that 
an enemy state, with its conventional armed forces, could employ to 
accomplish its hostile goals. Regardless, terrorism, ordinarily 
described as a tactic used by non-state movements to achieve their 
ends, was in this instance tied directly to the actions of imperial 
Japan during World War II. In Justice Burton’s view, this state of 
affairs—the attack on Pearl Harbor and its aftermath—would warrant 
greater deference to legislative and executive branches, even if such 
deference were to permit the suspension of habeas corpus and 
imposition of martial law.46  
Throughout the early stages of the Cold War, the Supreme 
Court made numerous decisions concerning the activities of accused 
members of the Communist Party in the United States.47 In those 
decisions, the Court referred to terrorism as a tactic that communists 
engaged in and advocated, both in the United States and abroad, to 
achieve their desired political changes. For example, in American 
Communications Ass’n v. Douds, a decision sustaining the 
constitutionality of loyalty oaths for union members, the Court 
referred to the Communist Party’s “un-American” methods that had 
been “imported” by American Communists: 
Violent and undemocratic means are the calculated and 
indispensable methods to attain the Communist Party’s goal. It 
would be incredible naïveté to expect the American branch of this 
movement to forego the only methods by which a Communist 
Party has anywhere come into power. In not one of the countries it 
now dominates was the Communist Party chosen by a free or 
 
 45. See id. 
 46. See id. at 338–39. 
 47. See, e.g., Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Noto v. United States, 
367 U.S. 290 (1961); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Communist Party of U.S. 
v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468 
(1958); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Schware v. Bd. of Bar Exam’rs, 353 U.S. 
232 (1957); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 
(1951); Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950). 
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contestible [sic] election; in not one can it be evicted by any 
election. The international police state has crept over Eastern 
Europe by deception, coercion, coup d’état, terrorism and 
assassination. Not only has it overpowered its critics and 
opponents; it has usually liquidated them.48 
The Court thus included terrorism in a list of means that the 
Communist Party employed to establish police states in Eastern 
Europe. The Court classified terrorism as but one tactic among many 
that Communists might choose from to accomplish their illicit goals, 
which were antithetical to the United States’ foreign and domestic 
policy.49 
Similarly, in Dennis v. United States, the Court considered the 
constitutionality of the Smith Act, under which the petitioners were 
convicted of conspiring to utilize the Communist Party in the 
United States to advocate for the violent overthrow of the U.S. 
government.50 In upholding the statute and the convictions, the 
Court noted that the purpose of the Smith Act was “to protect 
existing Government, not from change by peaceable, lawful and 
constitutional means, but from change by violence, revolution and 
terrorism.”51 Again the Court demonstrated its willingness to restrict 
certain activities and expressions in the interest of protecting the 
government from change by violent and subversive means. The 
Dennis holding was a novelty, however, in that it construed the 
Smith Act as allowing prosecution even when the advocacy of violent 
overthrow of the government was not imminent,52 let alone realistic. 
However, consistent with Douds’s reasoning, underlying the 
prosecution was the axiom that terrorism was a tool that the 
Communist Party had historically used to further its illegal political 
goals. 
 
 48. Am. Commc’ns Ass’n, 339 U.S. at 429 (third emphasis added). 
 49. See id. (noting that American Communists have structured themselves according to 
Communist Party principles, resorting to “[v]iolent and undemocratic means” to accomplish 
their goals, even though “this country offers them and other discontented elements a way to 
peaceful revolution by ballot” (emphasis omitted)). 
 50. See Dennis, 341 U.S. at 495–97. 
 51. Id. at 501. 
 52. See id. at 510. The Court began to back away from the Dennis ruling in 1957 when 
it held that advocating for beliefs, as opposed to action, could not give rise to criminal liability. 
See Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); see also Healy, supra note 40, at 663–64. 
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Interestingly, Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion discusses the 
Smith Act’s origins as a tool engineered to combat anarchism.53 
Justice Jackson distinguishes anarchism from Communism, 
describing anarchism as a philosophy advocating “extreme 
individualism and hostility to government and property . . . to be 
achieved by violent destruction of all government.”54 Unlike 
Communism, however, the anarchism exhibited in the case involved 
“sporadic and uncoordinated acts of terror [that] were not 
integrated with an effective revolutionary machine.”55 This type of 
terrorism, as opposed to the more organized and politically 
coordinated activity associated with Communism, was random and 
took the form of riots, assassinations, and attacks on state officials.56 
Thus it seems that, at least in Justice Jackson’s view, terrorism can 
also undergird a movement for the violent eradication of 
government and organized society altogether, and it does not have 
to correspond to a movement to take over the country.57 
In Galvan v. Press, the Court considered the constitutionality of 
the petitioner’s conviction under the Internal Security Act of 1950, 
which “required deportation of any alien who at the time of entering 
the United States, or at any time thereafter, was a ‘member’ of the 
Communist Party.”58 Despite the government’s failure to establish 
the petitioner’s knowledge of the Party’s violent aims,59 the Court 
sustained both the constitutionality of the statute and petitioner’s 
conviction under it.60 The Court deferred to Congress’s 
determination that the Party had espoused ideals that were of such a 
threat to the U.S. government as to justify deportation of any alien 
who was a member of the Party.61 Specifically, the Court found most 
persuasive Congress’s finding that Communism was “a world-wide 
revolutionary movement,” aimed at “establish[ing] a Communist 
 
 53. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 562 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 562–63. 
 57. See id. at 564. 
 58. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 525 (1954). 
 59. See id. at 532–33 (Black, J., dissenting) (noting that the petitioner was to be 
deported “without proof or finding that petitioner knew that the party had any evil purposes 
or that he agreed with any such purposes that it might have had”). 
 60. See id. at 529–32 (majority opinion). 
 61. See id. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:07 PM 
1455 Humanitarian Law Project 
 1469 
totalitarian dictatorship” through the use of “treachery, deceit, 
infiltration into other groups (governmental and otherwise), 
espionage, sabotage, terrorism, and any other means deemed 
necessary.”62 Because immigration matters typically involve policy 
determinations made by the political branches of government, the 
Court concluded that membership in an organization advocating 
revolution by unlawful activity, including acts of terrorism, was 
sufficient to permit the deportation of that organization’s non-
citizen members.63 
While adjudging the legality of the various Cold War-era anti-
Communism statutes, the Court often struck the theme of giving 
deference to the political branches.64 In Communist Party of United 
States v. Subversive Activities Control Board, the Court considered 
the constitutionality of the registration requirements under the 
Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950 (“SACA”).65 SACA 
mandated that all “Communist-action organizations” register with 
the Attorney General.66 The Court upheld SACA’s constitutionality, 
again making reference to Congressional findings and accepted 
definitions of Communism that included the word “terrorism.”67 
Much like the cases discussed above, “terrorism” appears alongside 
“treachery, deceit, infiltration . . . espionage [and] sabotage” as a 
tool employed by the Communist Party to aid in the overthrow of 
governments and establishment of a Communist dictatorship.68 
 
 62. Id. at 529 (citing the Internal Security Act of 1950). 
 63. See id. at 531–32. 
 64. See Robert M. Chesney, National Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361, 
1376 (2009). 
 65. See Communist Party of U.S. v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 8 
(1961) (“A Communist-action organization is defined by § 3(3) as (a) any organization in the 
United States (other than a diplomatic representative or mission of a foreign government 
accredited as such by the Department of State) which (i) is substantially directed, dominated, 
or controlled by the foreign government or foreign organization controlling the world 
Communist movement referred to in section 2 of this title, and (ii) operates primarily to 
advance the objectives of such world Communist movement as referred to in section 2 of this 
title; and (b) any section, branch, fraction, or cell of any organization defined in subparagraph 
(a) of this paragraph which has not complied with the registration requirements of this title.” 
(quoting Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L. No. 831, 64 Stat. 987 (repealed 
1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 5, 56, 104; see also id. at 140 (Black, J., dissenting). 
 68. Id. at 5, 56, 104 (majority opinion); id. at 140 (Black, J., dissenting). 
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The Cold War-era Communist cases, concerned as they were 
with an organization that employed, inter alia, terrorism in service of 
its hostile goals, did not exhibit limitless deference to the 
government in its battle against Communism. For example, by the 
beginning of the 1960s, the Court drew what appeared to be a clear 
line between advocacy and action, with the former protected and the 
latter criminalized.69 Further, the Court recognized that one could 
be a member of a group perceived as hostile to the United States, 
such as the Communist Party, without violating the law. In Scales v. 
United States, the Court drew a distinction between an active 
member of the Communist Party, who shared in the group’s beliefs 
and ideals and worked toward enacting them, and a passive member, 
who did not engage in any specific conduct toward fulfilling the 
group’s illegal goals.70 Mere membership, without more, the Court 
reasoned, was insufficient to give rise to criminal liability.71 Then, as 
now, one can be a member of a terrorist group, provided that 
membership does not entail any direct activity on behalf of the group 
towards fulfilling its illegal ends. 
This Cold War-era decision has played an important role in 
terrorism prosecutions post 9/11. Consequently, parties attacking 
the constitutionality of § 2339B’s ban on providing material support 
to designated FTOs have relied heavily on Scales to bolster their 
position in challenges based on both the First and Fifth 
 
 69. See Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98 (1961) (“We held in Yates, and 
we reiterate now, that the mere abstract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching 
of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the 
same as preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some 
substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the future which is 
both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the otherwise ambiguous 
theoretical material regarding Communist Party teaching, and to justify the inference that such 
a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the Party as a whole, and not merely to some narrow 
segment of it.”). 
 70. 367 U.S. 203, 224–28 (1961). 
 71. See id. at 227–28 (“It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely becomes 
a member of an illegal organization, by that ‘act’ alone need be doing nothing more than 
signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one hand, and providing, on the other, 
only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others believe in 
what the organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement 
do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a criminal enterprise which is lent for 
instance by a commitment on the part of a conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. 
A member, as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal 
enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby necessarily committing himself 
to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever.”). 
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Amendments, but those challenges have met with little success to 
date.72 
D. Domestic Terrorism and the Ku Klux Klan 
Not all of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence concerning 
terrorism has dealt with threats that could be ascribed to foreign 
elements in some form or another. Historically, in considering 
legislative efforts to combat the phenomenon of racist violence that 
the Ku Klux Klan (“KKK”) represented in the wake of the Civil War, 
members of the Court have recognized that such violence could be 
properly described as “terrorism.” For example, in United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters & Joiners of America, Local 610 v. Scott, 
decided in 1983, the Court construed the applicability of 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1985(3)73 to a lawsuit brought by a company and its employees 
who had been beaten by union members protesting the company’s 
hiring policies.74 The Court narrowly held that private conspiracies 
that admittedly violate the terms of § 1985(3) do not give rise to a 
cause of action, as only conspiracies involving a state or intended to 
influence the activity of the state are covered.75 The dissent, while 
agreeing that the first section of the statute covers actions by state 
officials, disagreed as to the scope of the second section and argued 
that it intentionally created substantive rights against private parties 
who conspire to deprive others of their legal rights.76 
Pointedly, Justice Blackmun’s dissent remarked that § 1985 was 
commonly referred to as the “Ku Klux Klan Act,” a point the 
majority did not raise.77 The dissent further stated that the KKK’s 
campaign of murder and mob violence against those who disagreed 
with their political views in the Reconstruction Era had served as the 
impetus for the passage of the Act.78 The dissent also alleged that the 
 
 72. See Said, supra note 13, at 581 n.223 (citing cases supporting this point in the Fifth 
Amendment context); see infra notes 170–72 (citing cases supporting this point in the First 
Amendment context). 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (2006) (creating a cause of action for victims of conspiracies 
designed “for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class of 
persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the 
laws”). 
 74. See 463 U.S. 825, 827–28 (1983) [hereinafter United Brotherhood]. 
 75. See id. at 830, 833. 
 76. See id. at 839–40 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See id. at 850–51. 
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goals of the KKK’s campaign were to remove Republican politicians 
from office and replace them with sympathetic Democrats, or, in the 
alternative, to undermine the authority of those Republican officials 
by engaging in mob violence.79 The dissent characterized these 
activities as “terrorism,” which was often directed at African 
Americans in the post-antebellum South.80 A subsequent decision on 
the constitutionality of a Virginia statute criminalizing cross-burning 
echoed Blackmun’s description of the KKK’s goals and methods, 
albeit by referring to the group as imposing a “reign of terror.”81 
Like the Court’s use of the term “terrorism” in the prosecutions 
of Communists and anarchists under various state criminal 
syndicalism statutes, Blackmun’s dissent in United Brotherhood refers 
to terrorism as politically motivated violence engineered to bring 
about a change in government or policy.82 Therefore, by 1983, the 
concept of what constituted terrorism had already acquired generally 
understood contours. Nonetheless, unlike the defendants in those 
earlier state criminal syndicalism statute cases, who were prosecuted 
for their advocacy of groups with illegal goals that might engage in 
terrorism, the KKK actively pursued political change through 
violence. However, by the time of the United Brotherhood decision, 
the Court had already addressed this discrepancy by finding the 
criminal syndicalism statutes at the heart of the earlier prosecutions 
unconstitutional.83 
E. Terrorism in New Contexts 
The Supreme Court’s use of the term “terrorism,” first occurring 
in the context of the American occupation of the Philippines, and 
obtaining greater frequency in the conflict with communism (and 
anarchy) both before and after the Cold War, while continually 
 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id. at 851 n.15 (“Negroes frequently were the objects of this terrorism . . . .”). 
 81. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 353 (2003). Of course, this was not the first time 
the Supreme Court used the phrase “reign of terror” to describe the KKK’s activities in the 
post-Civil War period. See, e.g., Jett v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 722 (1989); 
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 337 (1983). 
 82. United Brotherhood, 463 U.S. at 850–51 n.15 (The Klan’s goal was to overthrow 
Republican Reconstruction policies both by terrorizing local supporters of those policies in 
order to place sympathetic Democrats in office, and when that failed by supplanting the 
authority of local officials directly with mob violence.”). 
 83. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 456 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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being recognized as an apt description of the KKK’s violent 
activities, acquired a greater universality of use in subsequent and 
diverse situations. This in turn reinforced the notion that terrorism is 
a tactic used by a wide range of groups—from across the political 
spectrum—in furtherance of their goals. 
In an opinion concurring in the denial of certiorari to an 
individual convicted of conspiring to riot, advocating criminal 
anarchy, and conspiring to engage in such advocacy, Justice Stewart 
wrote to delineate his view of what constitutes an overt act in 
furtherance of a conspiracy.84 The defendant was “a self-
acknowledged Marxist” resident of Harlem who had been charged in 
connection with an attempt to conduct an armed revolt against the 
police. He argued that the overt acts underpinning the charges 
against him lay in speeches he had given, i.e., protected advocacy 
under the First Amendment, and as such could not rise to the level 
of an overt act, 85 a view shared only by Justice Douglas.86 Justice 
Stewart agreed in theory with Justice Douglas, but argued that the 
defendant had been charged with the overt acts of forming a group 
“under the direction of ‘block captains’ and with the assistance of 
‘terrorist bands,’ equipped with Molotov cocktails that Epton 
himself [had] explained how to use,” activities that could not make a 
“serious claim to constitutional protection.”87 While Justice Stewart’s 
mention of terrorism is brief, clearly he believed that armed action 
against the police geared at spreading anarchy qualified as terrorism 
under the general definition of the term. 
For the most part, however, despite the homegrown threat that 
the KKK and other isolated situations represented, in the decades 
before 9/11 the Supreme Court tended to define terrorism as a 
threat emerging abroad. In an opinion denying tax-exempt status to 
not-for-profit private schools that engaged in religiously motivated 
racial discrimination, the Court remarked that were it to hold 
otherwise, “a band of former military personnel might well set up a 
school for intensive training of subversives for guerilla warfare and 
terrorism in other countries” and qualify as a tax-exempt educational 
 
 84. See Epton v. New York, 390 U.S. 29, 30 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring in the 
denial of certiorari). 
 85. People v. Epton, 227 N.E.2d 829, 831–34 (N.Y. 1967). 
 86. See Epton, 390 U.S. at 30–34 (Douglas, J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari). 
 87. Id. at 30, n.† (Stewart, J., concurring in the denial of the certiorari). 
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institution.88 Thus, the Court made a clear link between terrorism 
and conflicts taking place abroad. Additionally—although perhaps 
unintentionally—the Court mentioned terrorism and guerilla warfare 
in the same breath, thereby associating terrorism with non-state 
actors waging war against foreign regimes. One year later, the Court 
reiterated this version of what constituted terrorism in a case 
challenging the Cuban Assets Control Regulations.89  
Thus, prior to September 11, 2001, terrorism was principally 
associated with violence taking place abroad and committed by 
foreign entities. 
Nevertheless, that is not to say that terrorism was never 
conceived of as a more generalized threat in Supreme Court opinions 
before September 11, 2001. All along, it was clear that Americans 
could be the victims of foreign terrorism, as the Court’s opinion 
regarding a personal injury action filed by passengers of the Achille 
Lauro cruise ship, hijacked in the Mediterranean in 1985, 
demonstrated.90 In addition to archetypal terrorist activity (e.g., 
hijacking), the Supreme Court acknowledged that terrorism is a 
more nebulous concept that can lurk as a generalized fear. For 
example, in United States v. Sokolow the Court held that while 
individual factors in a Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) 
profile did not constitute reasonable suspicion for an arrest, the 
combination of factors did amount to reasonable suspicion.91 In 
 
 88. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 592 n.18 (1983). To bolster its 
point, the Court noted that “Fagin’s school for educating English boys in the art of picking 
pockets” would also qualify for tax-exempt status under a different analysis, thereby 
categorizing terrorism with completely illegitimate criminal activity. Id. (citing Green v. 
Connally, 380 F. Supp. 1150, 1160 (D.D.C. 1971)). Justice Rehnquist’s dissenting opinion, 
while obviously disagreeing with the holding, rejected the idea that his reading of the law 
would bestow tax-exempt status on either a terrorist school or a pickpocket academy. See id. at 
619 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 89. See Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (citing with approval that “[i]n the 
opinion of the State Department, Cuba, with the political, economic, and military backing of 
the Soviet Union, has provided widespread support for armed violence and terrorism in the 
Western Hemisphere”). 
 90. See Lauro Lines S.R.L. v. Chasser, 490 U.S. 495, 496 (1989) (noting that the ship 
was “hijacked by terrorists”). 
 91. See United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 3 (1989) (noting that the factors that the 
DEA had relied on were that “(1) he paid $2,100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 
bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone 
number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) he 
stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to Miami 
takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of his 
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dissent, Justice Marshall took issue with the factors making up the 
profile, specifically the “sole behavioral detail” the DEA relied on in 
making the assessment that the defendant fit the profile of a drug 
courier—nervousness in an airport.92 Justice Marshall criticized this 
position by noting that “[w]ith news accounts proliferating of plane 
crashes, near collisions, and air terrorism, there are manifold and 
good reasons for being agitated while awaiting a flight, reasons that 
have nothing to do with one’s involvement in a criminal 
endeavor.”93 In his view, behaving nervously in an airport is not a 
legitimate factor toward establishing reasonable suspicion for 
criminal investigatory purposes, since the threat of terrorism, inter 
alia, may cause travelers to be on edge.94 As applied here, terrorism is 
more than just a threat to people abroad caught in foreign conflicts, 
and can strike any traveler, anywhere, and at any time, a natural 
result of an era in which airline hijacking is used as a tool to make a 
political point.  
But despite Justice Marshall’s articulation of a generalized, 
existential threat of terrorism, there is evidence of certain 
assumptions about what terrorism represents. By way of example, in 
a case considering the applicability of the First Amendment to a 
boycott arranged by court-appointed lawyers seeking increased 
compensation for their representation of indigent defendants, Justice 
Brennan opined in dissent: “If a boycott uses economic power in an 
unlawful way to send a message, it cannot claim First Amendment 
protection from the antitrust laws, any more than a terrorist could 
use an act of violence to express his political views and then assert 
immunity from criminal prosecution.”95 This example is instructive 
in that it is based on the same assumption about terrorism that we 
have seen articulated time and again by the Supreme Court, namely 
that it is an illegal act of violence engineered with a political goal in 
mind. What is perhaps novel about this statement is its presumption 
that terrorists should be tried as criminals. 
While this may be a legitimate view as to how best to hold 
perpetrators of illegal political violence accountable, it does raise the 
 
luggage”). 
 92. Id. at 15 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 93. Id. (emphasis added). 
 94. See id. 
 95. FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 448 n.7 (1990) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). 
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question of what other powers the government may claim when 
responding to the threat of terrorism. Where terrorism was once 
simply perceived as one tool employed among many others by 
identifiable groups specifically hostile to the United States, there 
developed a more generalized fear of the phenomenon, whether 
directed at American targets or not, which did not limit the 
government’s options for combating it to merely criminal trials. As a 
result of a growing awareness of terrorism as a transnational tactic, 
the powers that the government accrued became more explicitly 
defined and expanded. 
These powers expanded in many dimensions, starting well before 
9/11. Beginning in the late 1960s, when general social upheaval in 
the United States coincided with frequent airplane hijackings, the 
government responded by mandating suspicionless searches of 
individuals at airports, courts, and government buildings.96 Courts 
repeatedly upheld these searches despite various Fourth Amendment 
challenges to the practice.97 Accordingly, airline hijackings and 
attacks on government buildings decreased markedly.98 The Supreme 
Court came to understand that tactics like using hidden devices to 
surreptitiously record conversations with terrorist suspects were 
legitimate tools that did not violate one’s privacy under the Fourth 
Amendment.99  
As terrorism began to develop into a phenomenon that more 
Americans understood, via news reports on airplane hijackings and 
political upheavals worldwide, the Supreme Court was confronted 
with the task of managing the legal response to the phenomenon. In 
so doing, the Court began to take a wider view of terrorism’s scope 
and potential for harm, both in the United States and abroad. While 
not yet rising to the level of a worldwide existential threat to free 
societies everywhere, the Court’s characterization of terrorism in 
these new contexts foreshadowed post-9/11 developments. 
 
 96. See Ric Simmons, Searching for Terrorists: Why Public Safety Is Not a Special Need, 
59 DUKE L.J. 843, 850–55 (2010) (outlining the historical context that gave rise to 
suspicionless searches). 
 97. See id. at 852–55. 
 98. See id. 
 99. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 770 n.3 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
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F. Terrorism as a Basis for Heightened Punishment 
Additionally, the Court also began to articulate a rationale as to 
why terrorist crimes could warrant heightened punishment. In 1978, 
when it declared the death sentence for the rape of an adult woman 
unconstitutional, the majority in Coker v. Georgia did not comment 
on the fact that Georgia’s death penalty statute provided for capital 
punishment in cases of airplane hijacking, even where there was no 
loss of life.100 While this observation may initially seem unremarkable, 
given that the constitutionality of the death sentence for air hijacking 
was not under consideration by the Court, the majority’s holding did 
not go without comment. In dissent, Chief Justice Burger worried 
that the ruling would have far-reaching consequences: 
We cannot avoid taking judicial notice that crimes such as airplane 
hijacking, kidnaping, and mass terrorist activity constitute a serious 
and increasing danger to the safety of the public. It would be 
unfortunate indeed if the effect of today’s holding were to inhibit 
States and the Federal Government from experimenting with 
various remedies—including possibly the imposition of the penalty 
of death—to prevent and deter such crimes.101 
Thirty years later, the Court addressed Justice Burger’s concern 
more closely. In 2008, while the Court expanded on Coker’s ruling 
and held the death penalty unconstitutional for the rape of a child, 
the majority expressly limited the applicability of its holding: 
Our concern here is limited to crimes against individual persons. 
We do not address, for example, crimes defining and punishing 
treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug kingpin activity, which are 
offenses against the State. As it relates to crimes against individuals, 
though, the death penalty should not be expanded to instances 
where the victim’s life was not taken.102 
 The common theme across opinions rendered thirty years apart is 
that terrorism is a public safety offense that affects not only 
individual victims but the state itself, and concomitantly its well-
 
 100. See 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977). 
 101. Id. at 621 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger also wrote that Coker’s 
ruling “casts serious doubt upon the constitutional validity of statutes imposing the death 
penalty for a variety of conduct which, though dangerous, may not necessarily result in any 
immediate death, e.g., treason, airplane hijacking, and kidnaping.” Id. 
 102. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008). 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1478 
being and sense of security. Because of its far-reaching consequences, 
which affect not only specific victims, terrorist crimes could warrant a 
death sentence even where no loss of life occurs, something that the 
Supreme Court has ruled out in the “ordinary” crime context.103 
Indeed, as early as 1990, the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
expanding legislative and jurisdictional bases for combating the 
phenomenon of terrorism occurring abroad, in deference to the 
heightened threat that terrorism had come to represent.104 With this 
growing recognition of the existence of a lurking, foreign, and 
poorly understood threat came the understanding that the specter of 
terrorism would justify deviations from the norm in more and more 
cases. In 1997, a 5-4 decision holding unconstitutional the Brady 
Act’s requirement that states conduct background checks and impose 
other procedures on potential handgun purchasers engendered a 
spirited dissent by Justice Stevens.105 In arguing that the Brady Act 
provision in question was constitutional, the dissent explained  that 
certain national emergencies, such as the nation’s “epidemic of gun 
violence,” warranted and justified a heightened federal response.106 
Justice Stevens also listed other examples of situations warranting use 
of heightened national emergency powers by the Congress and the 
President, which included “[m]atters such as the enlistment of air 
raid wardens, the administration of a military draft, the mass 
inoculation of children to forestall an epidemic, or perhaps the threat 
of an international terrorist.”107 
Two assumptions are inherent in this statement. First, terrorism 
may rise to the level of a national emergency that implicates the 
exercise of greater powers by the political branches of government. 
Justice Stevens does not go so far as to outline specific types of 
terrorism or situations that would justify such a response, but rather 
simply notes that the possibility exists. Second, an actual terrorist 
 
 103. Incidentally, the air hijacking provision of Georgia’s death penalty statutes remains 
in place to this day. See Death Penalty for Offenses Other Than Murder, DEATH PENALTY 
INFORMATION CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?&did=2347 (last 
visited Oct. 4, 2011). Georgia is one of only two states to hold out the possibility of capital 
punishment for such a crime. See id. 
 104. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 280–81 n.4 (1990) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing numerous statutes that expand criminal jurisdiction over acts 
committed abroad, including, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331). 
 105. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 939 (1997) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 940 (citation omitted). 
 107. Id. 
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attack need not occur to activate these heightened powers—the mere 
threat of an attack suffices. While this may not seem like a great 
distinction, it underscores the preventative role that the government 
can play in stopping terrorism before it occurs and foreshadows a 
tack the government would later take. Indeed, the idea of 
preventative prosecution of terrorist crimes became a central focus of 
the government’s counterterrorism strategy post-9/11—in sharp 
contrast to the previous focus of punishing individuals for acts 
already committed.108 
G. Terrorism and Immigration 
1. AADC v. Reno 
In the immigration context, where the Supreme Court maintains 
a historically deferential position regarding the actions of the political 
branches, preventative deportation (to say nothing of exclusion) of 
those suspected of terrorist sympathies has been explicitly 
recognized. In Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination 
Committee (“AADC”), the Court ruled that immigrants in 
deportation proceedings may not advance claims that they have been 
targeted because of their unfavorable political views: “an alien 
unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert 
selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.”109 
Specifically, individuals who were targeted for deportation because of 
their alleged affiliation with the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine, a terrorist group, were not entitled to argue that they were 
being targeted because of their unpopular political views, while 
others engaging in exactly the same activity on behalf of less 
controversial groups avoided deportation proceedings.110 In the 
words of Professor Gerald Neuman,  
 
 108. See DAVID COLE & JULES LOBEL, LESS SAFE, LESS FREE 26–28, 102 (2007); 
Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Threat of 
Unaffiliated Terrorism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 430 (2006). 
 109. 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999). The ruling itself was somewhat surprising, given that the 
Supreme Court denied review of the selective enforcement First Amendment challenge. See 
DAVID COLE & JAMES X. DEMPSEY, TERRORISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 51 (3d ed. 2006). 
 110. Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 491–492 (1999) 
(“When an alien’s continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, 
the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason 
that it believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity.”). 
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[t]he general lesson of AADC is that so long as an alien is 
deportable, she is not entitled to know why she was chosen for 
deportation, and (with a possible exception for especially 
“outrageous” reasons, which do not include mere First 
Amendment objections) the reason is irrelevant to enforcement of 
removal.111 
Presumably, in the normal course of affairs, therefore, politically 
motivated targeting of those suspected of links with terrorist groups 
can proceed, except in those “rare” cases where the government’s 
conduct is “outrageous,” although the Supreme Court has yet to 
confront such a situation.  
2. Zadvydas v. Davis 
However, while selective prosecution claims are notoriously 
difficult to prove in any context,112 the Supreme Court’s ruling in 
Zadvydas v. Davis113 (another immigration-related decision) 
reinforces the unique nature of a terrorism link. In Zadvydas (an 
opinion released only a few months before the September 11, 2001 
attacks), the Court held that the indefinite detention of otherwise 
deportable aliens would raise “serious constitutional concerns.”114 As 
a result, in those cases where there is no realistic prospect of 
deportation beyond a “reasonable” period of six months, it becomes 
presumptively less and less reasonable to continue to confine the 
alien.115 Stated another way, “an alien may be held in confinement 
until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of 
removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.”116 Part of the rationale 
behind the Zadvydas ruling lay in the fact that indefinite detention of 
deportable aliens in such circumstances may end up being 
permanent.117 
 
 111. Gerald L. Neuman, Discretionary Deportation, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611, 630 
(2006). 
 112. See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (noting that a successful 
selective prosecution claim must allege that the decision to prosecute “had a discriminatory 
effect and that it was motivated by a discriminatory purpose”); see also United States v. 
Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 468 (1996) (applying a “rigorous standard for the elements of a 
selective-prosecution claim”). 
 113. 533 U.S. 678 (2001). 
 114. Id. at 682. 
 115. Id. at 701. 
 116. Id. 
 117. See id. at 691. 
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But the Zadvydas majority made sure to articulate an exception 
to its reasonableness analysis on the issue of the detention of 
deportable aliens when the specter of terrorism arose. Specifically, 
the Court remarked: “[W]e [do not] consider terrorism or other 
special circumstances where special arguments might be made for 
forms of preventive detention and for heightened deference to the 
judgments of the political branches with respect to matters of 
national security.”118 This statement leaves open the possibility that 
aliens linked to terrorism, but facing no realistic prospect of removal 
from the United States, can be held for an indefinite period, even if 
that period is potentially permanent. The statement is also prescient, 
albeit unintentionally. While the members of the Supreme Court, 
like the rest of American society, had no idea what was to transpire a 
few months later in New York City and Washington, D.C., they 
would soon be asked to rule on the constitutionality of the indefinite 
detention of aliens identified as terrorists hostile to the United 
States. 
The idea of a terrorist exception to various constitutional 
guarantees was not limited to the immigration context. In the 2000 
decision City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, the Supreme Court 
invalidated a roadblock scheme enacted by the Indianapolis police 
department whose primary purpose was stopping the possession of 
and traffic in illegal narcotics.119 Because a roadblock constituted a 
seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, the police needed some 
level of individualized suspicion to pull over motorists for 
“detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing.”120 In an 
interesting parallel to the analysis in Zadvydas, a case that is 
otherwise entirely unrelated, the Court noted that because a 
roadblock is a type of seizure, it must be “reasonable” per the 
requirements of the Fourth Amendment.121 So, just as the detention 
of a noncitizen pending deportation was presumptively unreasonable 
after six months, the erection of a roadblock for general crime-
control purposes, without individualized suspicion, was also 
presumptively unreasonable. 
 
 118. Id. at 696. 
 119. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000). 
 120. Id. at 38, 41. 
 121. Id. at 40. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:07 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2011 
1482 
However, the Court, in dicta, also noted that certain 
emergencies would allow the authorities to make use of a general 
roadblock where no individualized suspicion was present; specifically, 
“the Fourth Amendment would almost certainly permit an 
appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an imminent 
terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to flee 
by way of a particular route.”122 Therefore, just as Zadvydas 
recognized that the government may have a constitutionally 
legitimate interest in indefinitely holding a terrorist for national 
security purposes, Edmond likewise recognized the constitutional 
legitimacy of roadblocks to prevent imminent terrorism. Unlike 
Zadvydas, though, which did not articulate what sort of threat the 
terrorist might pose, the language in Edmond pointedly spoke about 
an exception in cases of a direct, impending attack within the United 
States. 
A review of the decisions cited so far reveals that in the few 
decades preceding 9/11, terrorism had become a more pressing 
concern to society at large. Where once the Communist Party and, 
to a lesser extent, the KKK, dominated the Court’s discussion of 
terrorism, and the Court simply viewed terrorism as a mere tactic, 
the more recent discourse has come to internalize the notion of 
terrorism as a lurking, existential threat, principally foreign in nature. 
Further, in many situations where the government may otherwise be 
constrained in its actions by the Constitution, the immediate threat 
of a terrorist attack will allow for deviations from the general norm. 
Here the message is clear, albeit unstated: the terrorism that the 
Supreme Court hypothesizes about targets the United States. This 
message was made more explicit in the Court’s post-9/11 
jurisprudence. 
III. POST-9/11 TERRORISM JURISPRUDENCE 
Post-9/11, Supreme Court Justices continued to highlight that 
the presence of a suspected terrorist or the potential of a terrorist 
 
 122. Id. at 44. Incidentally, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review used 
this language in support of its ruling permitting the government’s use of wiretaps geared at 
detecting terrorist activity, even where no emergency existed and the likelihood of harm was 
not “imminent.” In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 745–46 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002); see also 
Simmons, supra note 96, at 908–09 (criticizing the FISA Court’s decision as leading to a 
slippery slope, given that it “inexplicably equat[es] ‘emergency’ with ‘threat’” as a basis for its 
ruling). 
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attack would justify exceptions to general constitutional principles in 
a number of areas. However, the critical factor underpinning these 
opinions was the existence of a direct threat to the United States in 
some form or another. 
A. Terrorism’s Impact on Ordinary Criminal Cases 
This position was articulated in cases from the Court’s ordinary 
criminal procedure jurisprudence. For instance, Justice Stevens, in 
dissenting from a decision holding that an officer’s decision to shoot 
a fleeing suspect was a reasonable application of force, noted that the 
use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a felon is only 
constitutionally permissible where the officer has probable cause to 
believe the suspect, if permitted to flee, would pose a threat of 
serious harm to the officer or others, and where, if possible, the 
officer had issued the suspect a warning.123 Specifically, he noted that 
the use of deadly force was unreasonable because in this case the 
suspect had not threatened the officer, was apparently not armed, 
and was not fleeing from a violent crime.124 Justice Stevens remarked, 
however, that his position might have changed if the suspect were 
“the kind of dangerous person—perhaps a terrorist or an escaped 
convict on a crime spree—who would have been a danger to the 
community if he had been allowed to escape.”125 The dissent’s 
underlying thematic rationale is a familiar one: a terrorist poses a 
concrete threat to the public if not apprehended. Given the nature of 
the harm he or she might inflict if at large, deadly force can be 
employed more readily to subdue such a person than with a less 
dangerous criminal. 
A similar analytic logic was also applied in Illinois v. Caballes, a 
2005 decision involving a motorist who had been stopped for a 
traffic violation by a police officer.126 While the officer who had 
pulled Caballes over was issuing him a traffic citation, another officer 
who heard the report of the stop over the radio arrived on the scene 
and subjected the car to a search by a narcotics-detection dog, which 
revealed large quantities of marijuana.127 The Supreme Court held 
 
 123. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 203–04 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 124. See id. at 204–05. 
 125. Id. at 207 n.5. 
 126. See 543 U.S. 405, 406–07 (2005). 
 127. See id. at 406. 
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that the use of the dog did not violate the Fourth Amendment, even 
though the officers had no individualized suspicion that Caballes was 
in possession of anything illegal: “A dog sniff conducted during a 
concededly lawful traffic stop that reveals no information other than 
the location of a substance that no individual has any right to possess 
does not violate the Fourth Amendment.”128 
Justice Souter dissented, arguing that the use of the dog 
constituted an unlawful search and seizure where there was no 
reasonable and articulable suspicion.129 However, he also recognized 
that certain situations may justify the use of detection dogs, even 
where no individualized suspicion exists.130 The key factor was the 
degree of risk that each particular case posed to the public at large: 
I should take care myself to reserve judgment about a possible case 
significantly unlike this one. All of us are concerned not to 
prejudge a claim of authority to detect explosives and dangerous 
chemical or biological weapons that might be carried by a terrorist 
who prompts no individualized suspicion. Suffice it to say here that 
what is a reasonable search depends in part on demonstrated risk. 
Unreasonable sniff searches for marijuana are not necessarily 
unreasonable sniff searches for destructive or deadly material if 
suicide bombs are a societal risk.131 
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg echoed the 
above sentiment, noting that, according to Edmond, a situation 
giving rise to an “immediate” danger, such as an imminent terrorist 
attack or the presence of explosives, could justify an otherwise illegal 
search and seizure.132 The critical distinction lies in the difference 
between “the general interest in crime control and more immediate 
threats to public safety.”133 
While Justices Ginsburg and Souter made their remarks several 
years after 9/11, their statements resonate with several that were 
made by members of the Supreme Court in the few decades 
immediately preceding 9/11, when terrorism became a more 
pressing concern to society at large. The various exceptions to rules, 
 
 128. Id. at 410. 
 129. See id. at 410, 414 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 130. See id. at 417 n.7. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 424–25 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 133. Id. at 424. 
DO NOT DELETE 11/10/2011 5:07 PM 
1455 Humanitarian Law Project 
 1485 
constitutional or otherwise, suggested by Ginsburg, Souter, and 
other members of the Supreme Court, only make sense and retain 
salience when one construes them as necessary to protect Americans 
from the possibility of an attack. So when members of the Court 
reference terrorism in their opinions, they are generally referring to 
direct attacks on Americans. Because this dynamic is at the heart of 
the Court’s modern terrorism jurisprudence, it remains 
uncontroversial in its force as an argument. Who would not want the 
government to exercise greater discretion when the citizenry is faced 
with a terrorist attack?  
But while the Supreme Court’s deliberations on the matter of 
terrorism have focused on attacks on Americans, the question of 
terrorism aimed at foreign countries and populations has not been 
adequately addressed. The Court’s analytical dynamic regarding 
terrorism has typically involved an examination of whether an 
exception should apply to the given rule when there is a possibility of 
an attack against America. More often than not, the answer is yes, 
but with respect to terrorism taking place abroad against foreign 
targets, the Court has not provided a ready answer. 
B. Post-9/11 War on Terror Cases 
Since 9/11, the Supreme Court has had several occasions to 
address one specific issue engendered by the U.S. response to those 
attacks: What type of review is available to those individuals captured 
abroad whom the military suspects of being an “enemy combatant” 
in the service of al-Qaeda or the Taliban? These decisions have 
guided the development of what Professor Baher Azmy calls “a new 
common law of habeas,” which has emerged as a result of the 
government’s efforts to try suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters 
in military commissions.134 More importantly, these decisions suggest 
that the Court has now adopted a conceptualization of terrorism that 
views it as an existential threat to American civilization. Throughout 
the five major opinions in this area, Rumsfeld v. Padilla,135 Rasul v. 
Bush,136 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,137 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,138 and 
 
 134. Baher Azmy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of 
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445 (2010). 
 135. 542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
 136. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 137. 542 U.S. 507 (2003). 
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Boumediene v. Bush,139 terrorism is linked to attacks on the United 
States.140 While not stated explicitly, the implication of these rulings 
is that the war on terrorism is really concerned with groups that 
target the United States. Even so, habeas cannot be suspended for 
those active in such groups. Despite the fact that the individuals 
detained as enemy combatants at the U.S. naval base in Guantanamo 
Bay, Cuba are accused of posing a direct threat to the United States, 
the Court, over impassioned dissent,141 eventually held that they are 
entitled to habeas corpus hearings in federal court to challenge the 
status of their detention.142 
IV. HOLDER V. HUMANITARIAN LAW PROJECT—DESCRIBING A 
WORLD WHERE TERRORISM IS THE ENEMY, NOT ANY ONE GROUP 
In Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project (“HLP”), the Supreme 
Court, in an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, upheld the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B, the criminal prohibition on 
providing material support to designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations (“FTOs”), against various First and Fifth Amendment 
challenges.143 The opinion marked the culmination of a 
“complicated” jaunt through the lower federal courts, spanning 
some twelve years.144 Despite the lengthy procedural history, the 
unusual nature of the action—a civil suit seeking a pre-enforcement 
 
 138. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 139. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 140. See, e.g., id. at 797–98 (“Because our Nation’s past military conflicts have been of 
limited duration, it has been possible to leave the outer boundaries of war powers undefined. 
If, as some fear, terrorism continues to pose dangerous threats to us for years to come, the 
Court might not have this luxury. This result is not inevitable, however. The political branches, 
consistent with their independent obligations to interpret and uphold the Constitution, can 
engage in a genuine debate about how best to preserve constitutional values while protecting 
the Nation from terrorism.”). 
 141. See id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s 
opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us. It will 
almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
 142. See id. at 798 (majority opinion). 
 143. See 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2712 (2010). 
 144. Id. at 2716. In addition to the dispute over § 2339B, the Humanitarian Law 
plaintiffs brought a second suit, which was ultimately dismissed, to enjoin the government 
from declaring the groups “Specially Designated Global Terrorists,” a designation that 
functions similarly to FTO status, but derives from an Executive Order issued under the 
authority of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). Humanitarian Law 
Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Treas., 578 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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review of the use of a federal criminal statute—necessitated a finding 
by the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs “faced a credible threat of 
prosecution,” thereby constituting a justiciable case or controversy 
under Article III of the United States Constitution.145 
A. Section 2339B 
Section 2339B, enacted as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)146 by Congress in 1996 in the wake of 
the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing and a series of roughly 
contemporaneous suicide bombing attacks in the Middle East, was 
crafted to fill a gap left open by § 2339A, which was passed in 
1994.147 To respond to the perceived problem of terrorist groups 
raising money under the cover of humanitarian aid, § 2339B 
effectively closed any existing loophole, forbidding material support 
to an FTO for whatever reason—humanitarian, violent, or 
otherwise.148 In support of § 2339B, Congress made an explicit 
finding that “foreign organizations that engage in terrorist activity 
are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such 
an organization facilitates that conduct.”149 The statute does not 
require that any material support be linked to a violent act, and a 
conviction can bring a sentence of up to fifteen years in prison (or 
 
 145. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2717 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 
U.S. 289, 298 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“Based on these considerations, 
we conclude that plaintiffs’ claims are suitable for judicial review (as one might hope after 12 
years of litigation).”). 
 146. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 
Stat. 1214. 
 147. 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2006) (criminalizing the provision of material support to 
politically motivated act of violence). Section 2339A(6)(1) defines material support or 
resources as 
any property, tangible or intangible, or service, including currency or monetary 
instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice 
or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or more 
individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except medicine or 
religious materials . . . . 
Id.; see also Said, supra note 13, at 556. 
 148. See Said, supra note 13, at 556. 
 149. § 301, 110 Stat. at 1247 (making a finding, inter alia, that certain foreign terrorist 
groups raised funds for violent activity in the United States under humanitarian pretenses). 
This finding has been cited with approval by many courts reviewing the statute, including the 
Supreme Court in HLP. See Said, supra note 13, at 577 n.200 (citing cases). 
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life if a death occurs on account of the support),150 although the use 
of consecutive sentences to punish multiple convictions is not 
unheard of in § 2339B prosecutions.151 
The power to designate an FTO lies with the Secretary of State, 
who, in consultation with the Attorney General and the Secretary of 
the Treasury, may designate a group provided it (1) is foreign; (2) 
has engaged in “terrorism” or “terrorist activity”;152 and (3) 
“threatens the security of United States Nationals or the national 
security of the United States.”153 While the “security of United 
States nationals” is clear enough, the relevant statute defines 
 
 150. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (“Whoever knowingly provides material support or 
resources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined 
under this title or imprisoned not more than 15 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life.”). 
 151. See United States v. Al-Moayad, 545 F.3d 139, 145, 159 (2d Cir. 2008) 
(overturning § 2339B convictions and sentences of forty-five and seventy-five years on account 
of cumulative and prejudicial errors at trial); United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 354 
(4th Cir. 2004) (upholding a 155-year sentence), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005); Jason 
Trahan, 5 Decry Jail Terms in Holy Land Foundation Case, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 28, 
2009 (State and Regional News); Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Mohamad Youssef 
Hammoud Sentenced to 30 Years in Terrorism Financing Case (Jan. 27, 2011), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/usao/ncw/press/hammoudsentence.html; Press Release, Fed. 
Bureau of Investigation, Federal Judge Hands Down Sentences in Holy Land Foundation Case 
(May 27, 2009), available at http://dallas.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/dl052709.htm. 
 152. “Terrorist activity” is defined as follows: 
[T]he term “terrorist activity” means any activity which is unlawful under the laws 
of the place where it is committed (or which, if it had been committed in the United 
States, would be unlawful under the laws of the United States or any State) and 
which involves any of the following: 
(I) The highjacking or sabotage of any conveyance (including an aircraft, 
vessel, or vehicle). 
(II) The seizing or detaining, and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to 
detain, another individual in order to compel a third person (including a 
governmental organization) to do or abstain from doing any act as an explicit 
or implicit condition for the release of the individual seized or detained. 
(III) A violent attack upon an internationally protected person (as defined in 
section 1116(b)(4) of title 18) or upon the liberty of such a person. 
(IV) An assassination. 
(V) The use of any— 
(a) biological agent, chemical agent, or nuclear weapon or device, or 
(b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous device (other than 
for mere personal monetary gain),  
with intent to endanger, directly or indirectly, the safety of one or more 
individuals or to cause substantial damage to property. 
(VI) A threat, attempt, or conspiracy to do any of the foregoing. 
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
 153. Id. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4). 
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“national security” as the far murkier “national defense, foreign 
relations, or economic interests of the United States.”154 An FTO 
may seek judicial review of its status in the D.C. Circuit within thirty 
days of being so designated.155 Although to date no designation has 
been overturned, the court has twice remanded designation decisions 
to the Secretary of State, with instructions to convene a hearing and 
allow the FTO’s representatives challenging the group’s status 
greater access to any unclassified information relied upon in making 
the designation.156 The D.C. Circuit has so far refused to review the 
Secretary’s determination that an FTO threatens the security of U.S. 
nationals or American national security, effectively insulating that 
type of political decision from judicial review.157 
This is a critical point in any discussion of the government’s 
response to terrorism. While the previous sections of this Article have 
highlighted the Supreme Court’s encounters with terrorism, both 
international and domestic, and explained that the Supreme Court 
has settled on a generalized understanding of the phenomenon as 
being politically motivated violence against civilian targets, other 
legislative and prosecutorial efforts to tackle the problem have been 
rooted in an American nexus. This may be because, in the cases 
before the Supreme Court, Americans had either been directly 
targeted or directly harmed and, on that basis, the Supreme Court 
would recognize exceptions to constitutional doctrine. Dissimilarly, 
in the FTO designation-debate context, FTOs with no direct quarrel 
with the United States are forbidden from making arguments related 
to their particular cause and how it should not be perceived as 
inimical to American interests. Section 2339B therefore equates the 
threat to national security with the more nebulous threat to U.S. 
 
 154. Id. § 1189(d)(2). 
 155. See id. § 1189(c)(1). 
 156. See People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 613 F.3d 220, 231 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010) (remanding while leaving the designation intact); Chai v. Dep’t of State, 466 F.3d 
125, 134 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding the designation); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran v. 
Dep’t of State, 373 F.3d 152, 159–60 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (upholding the designation); People’s 
Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 327 F.3d 1238, 1245 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (upholding 
the designation); 32 Cnty. Sovereignty Comm. v. Dep’t of State, 292 F.3d 797, 799–800 
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (upholding the designation); Nat’l Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) v. 
Dep’t of State, 251 F.3d 192, 209 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (remanding while leaving the designation 
intact); People’s Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 20 n.3, 24–25 (D.C. 
Cir. 1999) (upholding the designation). 
 157. See People’s Mojahedin, 182 F.3d at 23; see also Said, supra note 13, at 562–63. 
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foreign relations or economic interests, accordingly imbuing the 
counterterrorist paradigm with a broader and more politicized 
framework.  
B. The Plaintiffs 
This dynamic was reflected in the facts of the HLP litigation. The 
plaintiffs, two U.S. citizens and six domestic organizations, wished to 
provide material support to two designated FTOs: the Partiya 
Karkeran Kurdistan (PKK), a Kurdish separatist group at war with 
the Republic of Turkey, and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE), a group that was ultimately defeated by the Sri Lankan 
army in April 2009 after a decades-long struggle to establish a Tamil 
homeland in that island republic.158 While it was beyond dispute that 
both groups engaged in politically motivated violence against 
civilians, the plaintiffs expressed their desire to provide financial 
support, specialized training, and engage in political advocacy on 
behalf of the groups’ political and humanitarian goals.159 Given the 
likelihood of prosecution if they were to go forward with their plans 
to provide the support noted above, they moved for a preliminary 
injunction on three grounds: (1) § 2339B violated the freedom of 
speech and association guarantees of the First Amendment because it 
failed to require that the government prove a specific intent on the 
part of the accused to support the illegal goals of an FTO, (2) 
§ 2339B was unconstitutionally vague, and (3) the Secretary of 
State’s unreviewable authority of FTOs invited impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination.160 The HLP litigation ultimately produced 
eight written opinions between the District Court and the Court of 
Appeals.161 
 
 158. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2713–14 (2010); Jon 
Lee Anderson, Death of the Tiger: Sri Lanka’s Brutal Victory over its Tamil Insurgents, NEW 
YORKER, Jan. 17, 2011, at 41 (detailing the defeat of the LTTE). One of the plaintiffs was a 
retired administrative law judge who had set up the Humanitarian Law Project, a human-rights 
NGO enjoying consultative status with the United Nations. See Humanitarian Law Project v. 
Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1188–89 & n.1 (C.D. Cal. 2004). This status, which renders 
the group “available for consultation at the request of the [UN],” derives from its ability to 
“make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the [UN].” E.S.C. Res. 1996/31, 
U.N. Doc. E/RES/1996/96, at Part III ¶ 24 (July 25, 1996). 
 159. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2714. 
 160. Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1184–85 (C.D. Cal. 
1998). 
 161. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916 (9th Cir. 2009), aff’d in 
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C. Specific Intent 
Throughout the HLP litigation, both the District Court and the 
Ninth Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenges, 
and refused to read a specific intent requirement into the statute.162 
The theory underpinning not only this ruling, but § 2339B itself, is 
that “money is fungible”; i.e., funds sent to an FTO for 
humanitarian purposes can free up money to purchase weapons, and 
therefore a § 2339B defendant need not have a specific intent to 
further violence when providing material support, given the danger 
inherent in such activity.163 In a subsequent ruling, the Ninth Circuit 
spelled out that the mens rea requirement for § 2339B liability is a 
defendant’s knowledge that an FTO had been designated or that it 
had committed violent acts amounting to terrorism.164 In December 
2004, Congress codified this standard in the Intelligence Reform 
and Terrorism Prevention Act.165 
 
part, rev’d in part, remanded by 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Justice, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 2004); Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of 
Justice, 352 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), vacated on reh’g en banc, 393 F.3d 902 (9th Cir. 
2004); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d 1130 (9th Cir. 2000); Humanitarian 
Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134 (C.D. Cal. 2005), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 
remanded by 130 S. Ct. 2705 (2010); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 
1185 (C.D. Cal. 2004); Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16729 
(C.D. Cal. 2001), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 352 F.3d 382 (2003); Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
 162. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1133–34; Humanitarian Law 
Project v. Reno, 9 F. Supp. 2d at 1196–97. To date no litigant has been successful on a similar 
First Amendment challenge to § 2339B. See, e.g., United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 
329 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (2005). 
 163. See Humanitarian Law Project v. Reno, 205 F.3d at 1136 (“[A]ll material support 
given to such organizations aids their unlawful goals. Indeed, as the government points out, 
terrorist organizations do not maintain open books. Therefore, when someone makes a 
donation to them, there is no way to tell how the donation is used. Further, as amicus Anti-
Defamation League notes, even contributions earmarked for peaceful purposes can be used to 
give aid to the families of those killed while carrying out terrorist acts, thus making the 
decision to engage in terrorism more attractive. More fundamentally, money is fungible; giving 
support intended to aid an organization’s peaceful activities frees up resources that can be used 
for terrorist acts. We will not indulge in speculation about whether Congress was right to come 
to the conclusion that it did. We simply note that Congress has the fact-finding resources to 
properly come to such a conclusion. Thus, we cannot say that AEDPA is not sufficiently 
tailored.”). 
 164. See Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d at 402–03. 
 165. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006) (as amended by the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638); 
Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 925 (“In December 2004, Congress 
passed IRTPA that revised AEDPA to essentially adopt our reading of AEDPA § 2339B to 
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By the time the issue reached the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs 
had narrowed their argument to a specific intent requirement only 
where the material support provided was limited to speech, thereby 
hoping to avoid urging the Court to rule on issues of constitutional 
law.166 The Court rejected this position as well, finding that, as an 
initial matter, Congress “plainly” spelled out the mens rea standard 
as requiring knowledge only.167 In the Court’s view, this position was 
fortified by the fact that Congress included a specific intent 
requirement in § 2339A (the ban on providing material support in 
aid of violent acts) and § 2339C (providing funds for unlawful 
terrorism-linked crimes), but neglected to do so both in passing 
§ 2339B in 1996 and in amending it in 2004.168 As for the plaintiffs’ 
argument that a specific intent requirement should be read into the 
statute when the material support takes the form of speech, the 
Court remarked that “[t]here is no basis whatever in the text of 
§2339B to read the same provisions in that statute as requiring 
intent in some circumstances but not others,” and as a result 
declined what it considered to be an invitation to judicially revise the 
statute.169  
Finally, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ reliance on Scales v. 
United States, which held that an individual could not be convicted 
under the membership provisions of the Smith Act unless he 
possessed a specific intent to bring about the group’s illegal goals, 
i.e., the overthrow of the United States government.170 In the 
majority’s view, the key point of distinction was that Scales dealt with 
a ban on mere membership, while § 2339B focuses squarely on 
conduct.171 The Court also pointed out how the holding in Scales 
“relied on both statutory text and precedent that had interpreted 
closely related provisions of the Smith Act to require specific intent,” 
as opposed to the distinctions in § 2339A–C.172 
 
include a knowledge requirement.”). 
 166. See Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 130 S. Ct. 2705, 2717–18 (2010). 
 167. See id. at 2717. 
 168. See id. at 2717–18. 
 169. Id. at 2718. 
 170. See id. (citing Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961)). 
 171. See id.; see also Robert M. Chesney, The Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws 
and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 84–85 (2005) (voicing a similar 
point). 
 172. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2718. 
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The Supreme Court’s ruling rejected the idea that a specific 
intent requirement was the culmination of a long, yet unsuccessful 
battle in litigation and print waged on many fronts and led by 
Professor David Cole, counsel for the HLP plaintiffs for the duration 
of the action.173 While much could be said about the Court’s holding 
on this point,174 what is most noteworthy is the brevity of the 
Court’s analysis, which is rooted in a strict distinction based on form, 
not substance. Unelaborated, the distinction itself appears artificial 
and unconvincing; are there not situations where membership 
represents a stronger show of support for a group’s violent goals 
than providing “material support” in all its manifestations for the 
political and humanitarian missions of an FTO?175 In dissent, Justice 
Breyer crafted a careful argument in support of the plaintiffs’ 
position, relying on the difference between material support in the 
true sense of the word and material support as speech or 
association.176 In addition to previous First Amendment 
jurisprudence and canons of statutory construction, the dissent also 
 
 173. See Said, supra note 13, at 582–84 nn.228–33 and accompanying text. 
 174. See id. at 582–93. 
 175. See David H. Pendle, Comment, Charity of the Heart and Sword: The Material 
Support Offense and Personal Guilt, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 777, 801–02 (2007) (“But it is 
possible that even seemingly harmless aid could have the effect of bolstering the organization’s 
reputation, which could thereby indirectly strengthen its ability to carry out terrorist attacks. 
However, by permitting membership, comparable reputational benefits could have accrued to 
the Communist Party through increasing the number of its official supporters. But the Scales 
Court determined that this ‘sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge 
that others believe in what the organization is doing’ was still too tenuous a relationship with 
the underlying substantive illegal conduct to justify imposing guilt without individual 
culpability. Similarly, any moral encouragement an FTO obtains from receiving training in 
international law, from knowing that the children under its control are being educated and fed, 
or from rejoicing that the wrongs its ethnic group has suffered at the hands of its government 
are being publicized internationally, is not sufficiently related to the promotion of international 
terrorism to justify imposing personal guilt on those who provided such support. This type of 
humanitarian conduct has neither the intent nor the substantive effect of strengthening 
international terrorism. Even if the donor knows the recipient is a designated FTO, a donation 
of this sort falls far short of some ‘significant action’ in support of the ‘criminal enterprise.’ In 
fact, unlike the defendant’s membership in Scales, which was held to be constitutionally 
protected, this type of humanitarian conduct may even fall short of a ‘mere . . . expression of 
sympathy with the alleged criminal enterprise.’ With this form of support, the donor may 
actually intend that the organization renounce its illegal objectives and pursue strictly 
nonviolent goals. Or the donor may want nothing to do with the objectives of the FTO, but 
merely intend to assist people who live under the FTO’s control in a time of need. Thus, the 
causal connection between the conduct and the crime, if existent, is weak.” (alteration in 
original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 283 (1961))). 
 176. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2739–42 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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noted the multiple and consistent examples in the legislative history 
of § 2339B indicating that nothing in its provisions should 
contradict the rights to freedom of speech and association.177 The 
Court dismissed these concerns with nary a mention in this portion 
of its opinion, although it did engage with them more fully in its 
discussion of the First and Fifth Amendment challenges.178  
D. Vagueness 
At the district court level, the plaintiffs successfully argued that 
the prohibition against providing material support in the form of 
“training,” “expert advice or assistance,” “service,” and “personnel” 
was unconstitutional under the vagueness doctrine of the Fifth 
Amendment’s Due Process Clause.179 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the plaintiffs’ argument with respect to “training,” “expert 
advice or assistance,” and “service,” but rejected it as to 
“personnel.”180 The Court first criticized the Ninth Circuit for 
confusing the vagueness analysis by importing aspects of First 
Amendment overbreadth doctrine to rule on an entirely hypothetical 
situation.181 Specifically, the Ninth Circuit had based its ruling in 
part on the government’s assertion that § 2339B prohibited the 
filing of an amicus brief on behalf of an FTO, an activity in which 
the plaintiffs had not asserted they wished to engage.182 Given the 
speculative nature of the argument, the Court found that the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning risked rendering both the vagueness and 
overbreadth doctrines redundant, and proceeded to conduct what it 
considered to be the proper vagueness analysis.183 
The plaintiffs, wishing to support the PKK, expressed their desire 
to carry out several types of activities that would be banned under 
§ 2339B, namely, “(1) ‘train[ing] members of [the] PKK on how to 
use humanitarian and international law to peacefully resolve 
disputes’; (2) ‘engag[ing] in political advocacy on behalf of Kurds 
 
 177. See id. 
 178. Id. at 2718–31 (majority opinion). 
 179. Id. at 2714–16. 
 180. Id. at 2716 (citing Humanitarian Law Project v. Mukasey, 552 F.3d 916, 929–31 
(9th Cir. 2009), aff’d in part, rev’d in part and remanded sub nom. Humanitarian Law, 130 
S. Ct. 2705). 
 181. Id. at 2719. 
 182. See id. 
 183. See id. at 2719–22. 
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who live in Turkey’; and (3) ‘teach[ing] PKK members how to 
petition various representative bodies such as the United Nations for 
relief.’”184 The LTTE plaintiffs had originally articulated several types 
of support but, because of the LTTE’s military defeat at the hands of 
the Sri Lankan army, limited their position to supporting the LTTE 
“as a political organization outside Sri Lanka advocating for the 
rights of Tamils.”185 
The Court rejected the vagueness challenges to all four terms. 
With respect to whether material support included “training” and 
“expert advice or assistance,” the Court found that the terms were 
clear as applied to what the plaintiffs proposed to do.186 In response 
to the plaintiffs’ arguments (and illustrative hypothetical examples) 
that the terms would prohibit far too much activity, the Court was 
unmoved: “Plaintiffs do not propose to teach a course on geography, 
and cannot seek refuge in imaginary cases that straddle the boundary 
between ‘specific skills’ and ‘general knowledge.’”187 The failure to 
articulate concrete activities that the plaintiffs wished to perform 
doomed their challenge to these two terms. 
With respect to the meaning of “personnel,” the Court found 
the statute to be clear in its prohibition; working under the direction 
of an FTO or running its affairs constituted the illegal provision of 
material support in the form of “personnel.”188 The Court relied on 
the fact that § 2339B permitted independent advocacy on behalf of 
an FTO in support of its goals, provided there was no relationship 
linking the individual and the group.189 Similarly, this rationale 
applied to “service,” as “a person of ordinary intelligence would 
understand that independently advocating for a cause is different 
 
 184. Id. at 2716 (alteration in original) (quoting Mukasey, 552 F.3d at 921 n.1). 
 185. Id. (quoting Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 11 n.5, 
Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-89)) (noting that the desire to help the LTTE 
present claims for tsunami-related aid to international relief agencies and provide legal advice 
on negotiating peace agreements with the government of Sri Lanka were moot due to the 
group’s eviction from the country). 
 186. Id. at 2720–21. 
 187. Id. at 2721 (citing Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756 (1974)). 
 188. Id. This reasoning mirrors, to a certain extent, the Court’s ruling and rationale in 
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, decided the same term as Humanitarian Law, 
which held that corporations have a First Amendment right to engage in advocacy on behalf of 
a given political candidate or cause, on the condition that they do so independently. See 130 S. 
Ct. 876, 908–13 (2010). 
 189. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2721. 
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from providing a service to a group that is advocating for that 
cause.”190 The chief weakness of this argument lies in its seeming lack 
of concern for the results of such independent advocacy. If FTOs are 
“so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
organization facilitates that conduct,”191 there is a legitimate 
question as to why it should make any difference whether the 
contribution—in this case, advocacy—came independent of the 
group, as long as the contribution provides a tangible benefit. 
This criticism also holds true for the Court’s negative 
construction of the types of “service” the plaintiffs wished to provide 
as too hypothetical, mirroring the same reasoning it applied with 
respect to “training” and “expert advice or assistance.”192 Where the 
plaintiffs questioned whether § 2339B delineated how to distinguish 
between illegal coordination and independent action, the Court 
deemed their concerns as “entirely hypothetical,” since they 
described “their intended advocacy only in the most general terms” 
without detailing how they might coordinate their activities with the 
FTOs in question.193 In making these statements, the Court expressly 
noted what the plaintiffs intended to do. But for § 2339B’s 
prohibitions, the plaintiffs would “offer their services to advocate on 
behalf of the rights of the Kurdish people and the PKK before the 
United Nations and the United States Congress”;194 “write and 
distribute publications supportive of the PKK and the cause of 
Kurdish liberation”; and “advocate for the freedom of political 
prisoners in Turkey.”195 The Court then dismissed the pre-
enforcement challenge on the basis that it would require “sheer 
 
 190. Id. at 2722. 
 191. Id. at 2724 (quoting Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 
301(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1247). 
 192. See id. at 2722. 
 193. Id. (quoting plaintiffs’ reply brief, Reply Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. 
at 14, Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-89), as asking, “Would any 
communication with any member be sufficient? With a leader? Must the relationship have any 
formal elements, such as an employment or contractual relationship? What about a relationship 
through an intermediary?”). 
 194.  Id. (quoting Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 10–11, 
Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-89)). 
 195. Id. (quoting Joint Appendix at 59, Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-
89), 2009 WL 3877534, at *59). 
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speculation” as to whether “activities described at such a level of 
generality” would constitute a “service” under the statute.196 
In characterizing the challenge as speculative and not presenting 
a concrete factual situation, the Court stretched in its interpretation 
of what the plaintiffs were proposing to do. Namely, it does not take 
too much speculation, if any at all, to figure out what the plaintiffs 
intended to accomplish if they were released from § 2339B’s 
expansive terms. In advocating before the United States Congress, 
they would be trying to get the PKK removed from the FTO list. If 
they went before the United Nations, they would be trying to garner 
international legitimacy “for the cause of Kurdish liberation.” 
Likewise, liberating political prisoners in Turkey is a specific activity 
that does not require too much conjecture in order to surmise its 
ultimate goal. But even if those activities are too general, and it is fair 
to say that reasonable interpretations may vary, especially considering 
the unknown nature of what the plaintiffs would propose to do 
before Congress or the United Nations, it is hard to see how 
“writ[ing] and distribut[ing] publications supportive of the PKK and 
the cause of Kurdish liberation” is speculative, since it speaks to a 
direct and concrete activity. The plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge raised 
the issue of whether distributing PKK literature (or propaganda) 
violates § 2339B. That point seems clear and specific, and the 
Supreme Court should have answered the question, even in the pre-
enforcement context. 
But beyond even these particular points, Chief Justice Roberts’s 
opinion on the matter of vagueness comes off as a bit rigid in its 
interpretation of what the plaintiffs were asking. It seemed relatively 
clear that the challenge to the term “service” encompassed an 
inquiry into whether the plaintiffs could try to garner support for an 
FTO in the United States, as long as they did not endorse or further 
violence. Characterizing these issues as speculative, when there was 
at least one unambiguous example given—distributing literature—
seems like a stretch. While the Court may have wished to avoid 
ruling on the plaintiffs’ vagueness challenge, choosing to cloak its 
holding in a reluctance to indulge speculation strains credulity 
because the plaintiffs made their position clear. They wanted to 
garner support in the United States and at the United Nations for 
what they perceived to be the just goals of the FTOs in question, but 
 
 196. Id. 
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eschew any support or effort that could result in violence. The way 
organizations generally do that is via well-known and well-worn 
forms of advocacy: lobbying government officials, garnering popular 
support by distributing literature and holding informational sessions, 
etc. While it is true that the plaintiffs did not spell out in detail the 
exact activities they contemplated, by requiring them to do so the 
Court seems to be formalistically insisting on their jumping through 
somewhat contrived hoops.197 
E. First Amendment Challenges—Freedom of Speech 
The Court next turned to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment 
challenges to § 2339B, arguing that its provisions violated their 
rights to freedom of speech and association. Chief Justice Roberts’ 
majority opinion devoted much greater attention to the freedom of 
speech challenge than it devoted to the freedom of association 
challenge.198 And in so doing, the Court returned to some of the 
themes articulated earlier in the opinion and elaborated on several of 
the theoretical and factual bases it used to support its conclusions.  
1. Standard of review 
The first issue the Court had to work out was the type of 
scrutiny with which it should review § 2339B. The Court remarked 
that both the plaintiffs and the government had taken “extreme 
positions” on the issue of speech and chastised both parties for their 
respective stands.199 In response to the plaintiffs’ argument that 
§ 2339B bans “pure political speech,” the Court directly disagreed, 
relying on reasoning it had employed earlier in the opinion to 
distinguish between speech, which is allowed, and material support, 
which is banned.200 The Court also rejected the government’s 
 
 197. In dissent, Justice Breyer takes issue with the majority’s characterization of the 
plaintiffs’ proposed activities as “lacking specificity,” and would have remanded the matter to 
the lower courts to examine in detail what activities might demand declaratory and injunctive 
relief. Id. at 2742–43 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 198. Compare id. at 2722–30 (majority opinion) (discussing freedom of speech), with id. 
at 2730–31 (discussing freedom of association). 
 199. Id. at 2722. 
 200. Id. at 2722–23 (“Under the material-support statute, plaintiffs may say anything 
they wish on any topic. . . . Congress has prohibited ‘material support,’ which most often does 
not take the form of speech at all. And when it does, the statute is carefully drawn to cover 
only a narrow category of speech to, under the direction of, or in coordination with foreign 
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argument that what was really in dispute in the case was conduct, 
not speech, finding unpersuasive the stance that intermediate 
scrutiny should apply, as § 2339B was not analogous to a statute 
criminalizing the burning of one’s draft card.201 Consequently, 
although the Court determined that § 2339B targeted conduct, 
because the plaintiffs desired to “communicat[e] a message” of 
specialized knowledge to the FTOs, the Court determined that 
speech was at issue and concluded that “more rigorous scrutiny” 
should therefore apply.202 Interestingly, the Court did not use the 
term “strict scrutiny.”203  
2. The issue and subsequent analysis 
In rejecting both positions, the Court reformulated the issue at 
hand in pursuit of the following inquiry: “whether the Government 
may prohibit what plaintiffs want to do—provide material support to 
the PKK and LTTE in the form of speech.”204 At first, the Court 
noted, the plaintiffs did not dispute the validity of the government’s 
interest in combating terrorism.205 Within this general 
counterterrorism paradigm then, the plaintiffs tried to distinguish 
their proposed support from what the statute should target. They 
argued that “combating terrorism does not justify prohibiting their 
speech . . . because their support will advance only the legitimate 
activities of the designated terrorist organizations, not their 
terrorism.”206 
How the Court responded to this position allows for a lengthier 
analysis of the assumptions and findings upon which it relied. 
 
groups that the speaker knows to be terrorist organizations.” (footnote omitted)). 
 201. See id. (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)). 
 202. Id. at 2724 (likening the case to Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 18–19 
(1971), in which a law barring disturbing the peace received strict scrutiny because the 
conduct at issue consisted of wearing a jacket displaying an obscenity). 
 203. See William D. Araiza, Citizens United, Stevens, and Humanitarian Law Project: 
First Amendment Rules and Standards in Three Acts, 40 STETSON L. REV. 821, 831 (2011), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1717049 (noting that the Court recites the formula 
for strict scrutiny without using the term, preferring instead “more demanding scrutiny”). 
 204. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2724. 
 205. See id. What is noteworthy is that the Court recognizes the open-ended nature of 
the government’s interest; the concern is fighting terrorism, presumably wherever it may occur 
and regardless of target, not merely terrorism against the United States. See id. 
 206. Id. (citing Opening Brief for Humanitarian Law Project, et al. at 51–52, 
Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-89)). 
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Deeming the inquiry into whether FTOs separate their legitimate 
activities from violence as “an empirical question,” the Court began 
by citing Congress’s finding that “foreign organizations that engage 
in terrorist activity are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any 
contribution to such an organization facilitates that conduct.”207 The 
import of this point was to demonstrate Congress’s stated belief that 
any aid to an FTO furthers violence, no matter its direct use. 
Coupled with Congress’s repeal of a provision in § 2339A that 
allowed for humanitarian aid to individuals unconnected to violence, 
the Court concluded that peaceful assistance, whether monetary or 
otherwise, was not allowed under the statute.208 
3. Material support providing “legitimacy” 
When Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion cited the evidence in 
support of this position, his argument began to lose its bearings. It 
made reference to an affidavit that a State Department official had 
submitted at the outset of the HLP litigation in 1998 that was 
included in the record before the Supreme Court.209 On the basis of 
what was a twelve-year-old declaration, the Court went beyond the 
familiar “money is fungible” argument to state that material support, 
no matter what guise it takes, “frees up other resources within the 
organization that may be put to violent ends.”210 Specifically, the 
Court highlighted that material support allows FTOs to derive 
“legitimacy” and that such “legitimacy . . . makes it easier for those 
groups to persist, to recruit members, and to raise funds—all of 
which facilitate more terrorist attacks.”211 
Confusingly, in support of its position on the illegality of 
promoting “legitimacy,” the Court cited only four sources 
suggesting that money is fungible, and that terrorist organizations—
in general—are not known for erecting institutional “firewalls” to 
prevent commingling of funds between their nonviolent and violent 
 
 207. Id. (quoting Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, § 301(a)(7), 
Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1247); see also supra note 150. 
 208. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
 209. See Joint Appendix, Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 (No. 09-89); William D. 
Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond the Rules, 44 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 39 n.272), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ papers.cfm?abstract_id=1758021. 
 210. Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2725. 
 211. Id. 
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wings.212 In addition to the affidavit submitted by the State 
Department official, the sources cited included a book by a former 
Treasury Department official on the FTO Hamas, as well as the 
amicus brief of the Anti-Defamation League, which also used the 
example of Hamas as a group commingling funds between its 
political and violent wings.213 
That the government cited such a limited number of sources in 
support of its position on the illegality of promoting legitimacy is 
troubling on several levels.  
First, after the billions of dollars that the government has spent 
on fighting a war on terror in the last ten years, was there no better 
official statement available than an affidavit dating from 1998? Surely 
the government could have produced something more up-to-date in 
support of its assertions about the PKK and LTTE’s financial 
structure. After all, much has changed in the realities facing both the 
PKK and the LTTE since 1998,214 and those changed realities and 
how they might have affected the structure of the two groups should 
be reflected in the official record. It is of concern that in assessing 
what the government considers a potential threat to national 
security, it saw fit to rely on outdated information, and the Court 
went along with that position accordingly.215 
Second, the only other group mentioned is Hamas, which is 
problematic in two ways, one quantitative, another qualitative. As to 
the former point, out of forty-nine banned FTOs,216 the Court uses 
this single example. In dealing with the phenomenon of subnational 
or non-state actors engaging in violence for political purposes, can 
the example of one group serve as a model for all? Phrased 
differently, even assuming the validity of the argument in the case of 
Hamas, does the argument that Hamas commingles funds mean that 
 
 212. Id. at 2725–26. 
 213. See id. 
 214. See Anderson, supra note 158 (detailing military defeat of LTTE in 2009); Craig S. 
Smith & Sebnem Arsu, European Court Urges Turkey to Grant Kurdish Leader a New Trial, 
N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2005, at A5 (noting that PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan was captured by 
Turkish forces in 1999, tried and convicted of treason, and is serving a life sentence in Turkey). 
 215. Indeed, the majority complains about the dissent’s insistence on more specific 
evidence and detail than that cited in the record, and notes that to require the government to 
make a greater showing would be “dangerous.” Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2727–28. 
 216. Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 
U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm (last 
visited Oct. 7, 2011) (listing forty-nine groups as FTOs). 
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all of the groups on the FTO list do so? When combating armed 
threats, it would pay to have more precise information on which to 
base a conclusion than the assertion of interested parties to a 
litigation speaking as to one group. The implication here is that all 
terrorist groups operate the same way and are to be treated as such 
because nothing they say or do can be considered legitimate, 
regardless of their cause or ultimate goal. On the qualitative point, 
the example of Hamas is telling. Neither the PKK nor the LTTE, the 
two FTOs at the heart of the HLP litigation, are Islamist groups, 
whereas Hamas, an Arabic acronym of its formal name, the Islamic 
Resistance Movement, is.217 While the choice of Hamas as the sole 
nonparty FTO may have been coincidental, when significant sections 
of officialdom and the populace view anyone who is Muslim with 
suspicion,218 coupled with the centrality of al-Qaeda as the chief 
enemy in the war on terror, introducing an Islamist group here is a 
neat trick. Because al-Qaeda is not a good example, as it has only a 
violent wing,219 bringing up one of the other detested Islamist 
bogeymen is a way of diverting attention from the specific examples 
of the PKK and LTTE to underscore the most unnerving and 
misunderstood aspects of the war on terror.220 Suggested, but not 
 
 217. The name “Hamas,” which means “zeal” in Arabic, derives from the first letter of 
each of the three Arabic words in its formal name—Harakat (Movement) al-Muqawama 
(Resistance) al-Islamiyya (Islamic). See Khaled Hroub, HAMAS, A BEGINNER’S GUIDE (2d ed. 
2010). 
 218. See, e.g., Samuel G. Freedman, A Dispiriting Time for Muslims on Capitol Hill, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 12, 2011, at A16 (discussing hearings in the House of Representatives geared at 
studying the problem of “the radicalization of American Muslims”); Spencer Ackerman, New 
Evidence of Anti-Islam Bias Underscores Deep Challenges for FBI’s Reform Pledge, WIRED.COM, 
http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2011/09/fbi-islam-domination/all/1 (highlighting 
the use of anti-Muslim materials in FBI counterterrorism training courses); see also Aziz Z. 
Huq, The Signaling Function of Religious Speech in Domestic Counterterrorism, 89 TEX. L. REV. 
833 (2011) (arguing that law enforcement agencies rely too heavily, and often erroneously, on 
religious speech by Muslims in America as evidence of terrorist associations). 
 219. See David Cole, The New McCarthyism: Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 
38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 14 (2003) (“An organization like Al Qaeda may present a 
special case, for it does not appear to have legal purposes at all. Unlike, say, the Irish 
Republican Army, the Palestinian Liberation Organization, or the ANC, groups with political 
agendas that use violent means among many others, Al Qaeda appears to do little more than 
plot, train for, and conduct terrorism. But if that is the case, we do not need guilt by 
association. It ought to be relatively simple to establish that when an individual affirmatively 
supports Al Qaeda, he intends to support its terrorist ends, because Al Qaeda has few if any 
other ends.”); see also United States v. Warsame, 537 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1015 (D. Minn. 
2008) (“Al Qaeda is not a political advocacy group.”). 
 220. Indeed, a focus on Hamas also informs an amicus brief submitted on behalf of 
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stated outright, is that support for the PKK or LTTE is just like 
support for America’s Islamist enemies in the war on terror. 
In dissent, Justice Breyer challenged the accuracy of the assertion 
that material support promoting legitimacy can be outlawed, 
pointing out that it is not at all clear how advocacy and petitioning 
the United Nations are fungible in the same way as money, food, or 
computer training.221 In his view, “[t]he Government has provided 
us with no empirical information that might convincingly support 
this claim.”222 He noted that all the evidence before the Court—the 
State Department affidavit and the legislative history—did not 
contemplate material support as taking the guise of peaceful political 
advocacy.223 Indeed, § 2339B itself contains language that suggests 
that it will not infringe on the First Amendment.224 Justice Breyer 
also argued that “there is no natural stopping place” for the Court’s 
characterization of legitimacy as illegal under the statute, when 
offered without qualification.225 Critically, it is “inordinately 
difficult” to understand when “the chain of causation” extends 
beyond material support in the form of speech that promotes a 
group’s legitimacy to actually furthering violent activity.226 
In addition to pointing out the inconsistency of the Court’s 
ruling with its First Amendment jurisprudence that permits 
membership in groups like the Communist Party, which was 
dedicated to overthrowing the government, Justice Breyer also 
criticized the distinction between independent advocacy of an FTO, 
which is permitted, and advocacy conducted in coordination with an 
 
individuals supporting the government in the Humanitarian Law litigation. See Brief of 
Amicus Curiae Scholars et. al. in Support of Petitioners, Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(No. 09-89); see also Peter Margulies, Advising Terrorism: Hybrid Scrutiny, Safe Harbors, and 
Freedom of Speech 20–21, 31 n.204, 34–35 (Roger Williams Univ. Legal Studies, Paper No. 
101), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1777371 (arguing that Hamas manipulates 
international law and its benign activities to further its terrorist goals, although acknowledging 
that the sources used by the Court to support these allegations “lack[ed] the independence 
and reliability of scholarly work”). 
 221. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2735 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 222. Id. 
 223. See id. at 2735–36. 
 224. See id. (“‘Nothing in this section shall be construed or applied so as to abridge the 
exercise of rights guaranteed under the First Amendment.’” (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(i) 
(2006))). 
 225. See id. at 2726 (majority opinion). 
 226. See id. 
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FTO, which is prohibited.227 When discussing matters such as 
training in international law, Justice Breyer took issue with the 
majority’s contention that an FTO could make use of international 
law to negotiate in bad faith while simultaneously rearming and 
rededicating itself to its terrorist mission.228 Specifically, such a 
position goes too far, because it “would automatically forbid the 
teaching of any subject in a case where national security interests 
conflict with the First Amendment.”229 Justice Breyer also challenged 
the evidence the Court relied on in making an assertion that it 
applied to all terrorist groups, irrespective of their particular cause or 
context.230 
Underpinning the divergence of views between the majority and 
dissent is a fundamental disagreement as to what the First 
Amendment is supposed to protect. The majority’s position is rooted 
in a clear line that begins with Congress declaring that terrorist 
groups are so tainted that any support for them constitutes support 
for violence. Once the Secretary of State declares that a group is an 
FTO, the group becomes so toxic and irredeemable that any 
coordinated activity that contributes to the nebulous quality of 
legitimacy is illegal. Arguments about the justness of the FTO’s 
cause are rejected as justification for terrorism, and any attempts to 
encourage the FTO to eschew violence are viewed as naïve ruses 
intended to allow a group to continue its violent mission 
surreptitiously. Once the government has spoken, the First 
Amendment rights of citizens must yield to the FTO determination. 
By contrast, the dissent actually holds out the possibility that speech-
related activities on behalf of an FTO can have a positive effect, 
regardless of how the government has characterized the group. 
Implicitly, the dissent’s position seems to recognize that an FTO 
might one day constitute a legitimate governing party in a foreign 
country (if the history of decolonization is any guide), such that 
advocating on its behalf deserves some protection, although 
furthering its violent ends is not permitted. 
 
 227. See id. at 2737 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 228. See id at 2737–38. 
 229. Id. at 2738. 
 230. See id. (“[T]he only evidence the majority offers to support its general claim consists 
of a single reference to a book about terrorism, which the government did not mention, and 
which apparently says no more than that at one time the PKK suspended its armed struggle 
and then returned to it.”). 
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In advancing this position, the majority relies on the paramount 
concern of national security.231 But national security is too much of 
an open-ended concept. Consider that the Court cited with favor the 
government’s efforts to build alliances with allied foreign nations to 
combat terrorism.232 It noted that the PKK is waging a violent 
campaign against the Republic of Turkey, “a fellow member of 
NATO,” which “would hardly be mollified by the explanation that 
the support was meant only to further those groups’ ‘legitimate 
activities.’”233 The Court remarked that the plaintiffs are simply 
disagreeing with the “considered judgment of Congress and the 
Executive” as to what constitutes material support, and therefore 
their First Amendment rights should be subordinated when the 
government seeks to prevent “imminent harms” and promote 
“national security.”234 
But national security presumably has at its heart the idea of a 
direct threat to the United States and its citizens, and whatever one’s 
opinion about any given FTO, the PKK and the LTTE are not 
actively engaged in conflict with the United States. That the Court 
chose to nonetheless assert that national security was the basis for its 
opinion suggests that it had adopted a new construction of 
terrorism. Perhaps the Court, in making the national security 
argument, recognized the inherent weakness in its position, since it 
then played an alarmist card: “If only good can come from training 
our adversaries in international dispute resolution, presumably it 
would have been unconstitutional to prevent American citizens from 
training the Japanese Government on using international 
organizations and mechanisms to resolve disputes during World War 
II.”235 While the Court’s earlier jurisprudence referred to terrorism as 
one tactic among many, and later on recognized the existential 
nature of a general terrorist threat, this statement represents the 
 
 231. See id. at 2727 (majority opinion) (“This litigation implicates sensitive and weighty 
interests of national security and foreign affairs.”). 
 232. See id. at 2726–27. 
 233. Id. Interestingly, the Court did not state what it believed to be the government’s 
interest in allying with the government of Sri Lanka, the LTTE’s antagonist. See id. 
 234. Id. at 2728. 
 235. Id. at 2730. This point may serve more than one purpose, of course. Professor 
William Araiza notes that this observation, coupled with Justice Stevens’ point about Tokyo 
Rose’s purported First Amendment rights in Citizens United (two “strikingly similar 
analogies”), signifies that “at least in some cases, rigid rules simply do not make good sense.” 
Araiza, supra note 209, at 37. 
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Court coming as close as it can to stating that terrorism—regardless 
of target and place—is the enemy. 
The implications of this statement are quite broad. After all, 
while the government may wish to support Turkey in its struggle 
with the PKK and “weighty” national interests may be involved, it is 
disingenuous to suggest that providing material support to the PKK 
in the form of speech is the same as providing the same to an 
opponent with which the United States is at war. In other words, the 
threat to Americans of aiding Japan during World War II is not the 
same as the threat represented by the PKK successfully establishing a 
Kurdish state in eastern Turkey. Where First Amendment rights 
might be curtailed because of actual national security concerns in the 
former scenario, the same argument in the latter scenario is much 
more attenuated. While the government may wish to strongly ally 
itself with Turkey, and can, as it has, accordingly offer military aid 
and cooperation, as well as criminalize the provision of aid that 
furthers violence, curtailing the First Amendment rights of citizens 
goes a bit too far when it reaches into nebulous areas like providing 
“legitimacy.” There is no “imminent harm” to Americans (and 
arguably anybody) in the type of speech-related support the plaintiffs 
wished to offer the PKK and LTTE.236  
Analogizing to the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court 
allows for constitutional protections to be relaxed when there is a 
direct threat to the United States. According to Edmond, the Court 
would presumably allow police authorities to set up a roadblock to 
conduct warrantless and suspicionless searches of motorists to stop a 
terrorist attack in the United States. Situating the same concern in 
the First Amendment context, a statute curtailing speech rights 
would need to respond directly to some sort of immediate threat 
that concerns the United States and its citizens, not merely via an 
alliance with a foreign nation the government wishes to further. 
After all, the government may decide one day to change its position 
on any given conflict, even the Turkey-PKK dispute, having 
calibrated that the national interest is best served by making such a 
change. It is much harder to imagine that the government would 
 
 236. In this position, the United States arguably has outstripped other democracies 
dealing with advocacy for terrorist groups, in that those other nations have only restricted 
speech rights for individuals articulating positions antagonistic directly to the nation in 
question. See Daphne Barak-Erez & David Scharia, Freedom of Speech, Support for Terrorism, 
and the Challenge of Global Constitutional Law, 2 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 1 (2011). 
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change its position on trying to stop any and all attacks on the 
United States.  
To the extent that there was real doubt about the overriding 
concern behind § 2339B, consider the following example from the 
oral argument in HLP. In response to Justice Sotomayor’s concern 
that Congress did not intend to target all possible specialized 
training, like teaching someone how to play the harmonica, then 
Solicitor General Kagan responded by saying that “there are not a 
whole lot of people going around trying to teach Al-Qaeda how to 
play harmonicas.”237 Perhaps this is a fair point to make if the focus is 
on groups targeting the United States. But it seems that the 
government exploited the conceptual ambiguity inherent in fighting 
terrorism between all groups that practice illegal political violence 
and those that target the United States. Where steps against the 
latter could include suppressing material support in the form of 
speech for national security reasons, it is much harder to justify such 
a position when the United States is not a party to a conflict with the 
former. After all, there is a real question of what, if any, harm might 
befall an American citizen, and if the answer is none, then the 
rationale behind banning material support in the form of speech to a 
group not targeting the United States is unpersuasive. Given the fact 
that under the law all politically motivated violence carried out by 
non-state actors is presumptively terroristic,238 allowing the 
government to operate on a theory of banning material support that 
enhances “legitimacy” chills First Amendment rights significantly.  
The HLP majority opinion concluded by finding that § 2339B 
did not violate the plaintiffs’ right to freedom of association.239 
Individuals are free to be members of, or advocate independently on 
behalf of, a group, but the Court drew a distinction between 
membership and material support.240 As Professor David Cole has 
argued, § 2339B has effectively rendered meaningless the right of 
association with an FTO; while technically one can still legally be a 
member of such a group, virtually any action on its behalf, such as 
paying membership dues, violates the law.241 The stigma of being 
 
 237. Transcript of Oral Argument at 47–48, Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. 2705 
(2010) (No. 09-89). 
 238. Said, supra note 13, at 570–76. 
 239. See Humanitarian Law, 130 S. Ct. at 2730–31. 
 240. See id. 
 241. See David Cole, Terror Financing, Guilt by Association, and the Paradigm of 
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designated an FTO, with its status of engaging in no redeeming or 
legitimate activities, has removed First Amendment protections to 
the point where mere speech on behalf of a group runs afoul of 
§ 2339B. Not only does the Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence 
not compel such a result when national security is not directly 
implicated; it actually rejects it. That the Court did not rule 
otherwise is problematic and should change.242 
V. CONCLUSION 
The HLP Court’s construction of § 2339B and the threat posed 
by terrorism is far-reaching. Not only is humanitarian aid to an FTO 
banned, regardless of what a lack of aid might mean for people in 
areas under an FTO’s control, but now expressions of solidarity such 
as working within a group for peaceful change are not allowed. 
Arguments rooted in justice or human rights about a given conflict 
are not permitted when made on behalf of an FTO, regardless of its 
position on violence against Americans. Where once terrorism was a 
mere tactic that the Supreme Court took into account in its 
construction of the law, now it is a force with which our society is at 
war, to the point where the government will fight its occurrence 
even in quarrels that have nothing to do with the United States. 
While the Court did point out, toward the end of the HLP opinion, 
that it is not “say[ing] that any future applications of the material-
support statute to speech or advocacy will survive First Amendment 
scrutiny,” it is hard to imagine such an application in light of the 
HLP analysis set forth above. The logical implication of HLP is that 
terrorism is now an existential threat to the United States wherever it 
occurs, and—as  long as the government has designated an 
organization as an FTO—that existential threat must be thwarted, 
even to the detriment of the First Amendment. 
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